Conclusion: New Modes of Lobbying for New Modes of Governance

Truijens, Douwe

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-64602-8_9

Cited by 1 publication

(7 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…As such, technical input can generally be expected to be delivered by those resourceful business actors from sectors that are targeted or affected by the policy (cf. Dür and Mateo, 2016: 5, 154–155; Head, 2008: 6–7; Truijens, 2021: 213–214).…”

Section: The Argument: Who Wins During the Implementation Stage?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The IED can be seen as a typical case of ‘new’ horizontal, iterative, and stakeholder and evidence-driven governance (Truijens, 2021: 56). The findings are thus insightful for similar governance frameworks in and beyond the EU.…”

Section: Empirical Illustration: the Eu Industrial Emissions Directivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…To that end, within the single case we follow a process tracing methodology – a method focussed on detailed reconstruction of decisions by, and interactions among, multiple actors, with explicit focus on their subjective interpretations (cf. Truijens, 2021: 39–40). Rather than connecting a cause to an effect, process tracing allows for disentangling interactions, interpretations and intentions that may explain the nature of the relationship between the cause(s) and effect(s) (cf.…”

Section: Empirical Illustration: the Eu Industrial Emissions Directivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This comment is very telling when it comes to having to follow a long-term and continuously demanding post-legislative process (answering to our first theoretical argument). This insight is furthermore backed by a comment of data protection and privacy NGO EDRi in a different case of EU legislation, who state that after legislation is passed all they can do is follow the implementation at the level of reading updates every now and then, as their limited resources forces them to ‘pick their battles’ – which generally leads them to focus on the next legislative process (Truijens, 2021: 147).…”

Section: Empirical Illustration: the Eu Industrial Emissions Directivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, the level of technical detail, including the specific circumstances under which data are gathered (for instance, the weather conditions, but also the moment of measuring), makes it difficult for third parties to actually perform these checks. Second, operators can be reluctant to deliver the data because of competition concerns if data are commercially sensitive, in which case this information cannot legally be demanded from the stakeholders (Truijens, 2021: 76). Taken together, verification by third parties is in practice very difficult, and the EEB will generally have to be confident that the information discussed in the TWGs has been thoroughly crosschecked by either the Member State competent authority or the EIPPCB (interview Christian Schaible, EEB).…”

Section: Empirical Illustration: the Eu Industrial Emissions Directivementioning

confidence: 99%

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It Ain’t Over ‘Til It’s Over: Interest-Group Influence in Policy Implementation

Truijens

Hanegraaff

2023

Political Studies Review

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Current research on interest-group influence in the European Union tends to focus on just one stage of the policy cycle, being agenda setting, the legislative process or (some aspects) of the implementation stage. We argue that this bifurcation of the research agenda is a serious shortcoming, as lobby dynamics may vary throughout different consecutive policymaking stages. As a consequence, lobby gains or losses in the legislative stage can be overturned in the implementation. This research note therefore explores how the influence of interest organisations travels across different stages of the policy cycle, most importantly between the legislative stage and the implementation stage. First, we observe that as policymaking is a continuous rather than a static process, also lobbying tends to stretch beyond the legislative stage. Second, we argue that the specific characteristics of the implementation vis-à-vis the legislative stage may structurally favour business and resourceful organisations over smaller groups and nongovernmental organisationss. Third, we illustrate the plausibility of our argument by means of an in-depth case study: the European Union Industrial Emissions Directive. We conclude with a call for a more integral approach to researching lobby powers throughout the policy cycle and provide a preliminary agenda for future research.

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Section: The Argument: Who Wins During the Implementation Stage?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Empirical Illustration: the Eu Industrial Emissions Directivementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Empirical Illustration: the Eu Industrial Emissions Directivementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Empirical Illustration: the Eu Industrial Emissions Directivementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Empirical Illustration: the Eu Industrial Emissions Directivementioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations