Conciliationism and Uniqueness

Ballantyne, Nathan; Coffman, E. J.

doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.627926

Cited by 42 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…We'll call this view “acknowledged permissivism” and refer to any witnessing case of this existential claim an “acknowledged permissive case.” Another form of permissivism might hold that permissive cases exist, but acknowledged permissive cases cannot. Cohen () defends this position, which we'll call “unacknowledged permissivism.” A number of authors have noticed the possible importance of this kind of distinction, although at times only implicitly (White ; Ballantyne and Coffman ; Cohen ; Schoenfield ; Levinstein forthcoming; Titelbaum and Kopec ms.).…”

Section: Different Forms Of Uniquenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many have claimed that the truth or falsity of Uniqueness has serious implications for various views in the epistemology of disagreement. For example, Feldman (), Kelly (), Ballantyne and Coffman (), Cohen (), and Schoenfield (), among others, have argued that there are tight relationships between various versions of Uniqueness and conciliatory views about disagreement. But others (e.g., Christensen , forthcoming; Lee ; Peels and Booth ; Levinstein forthcoming; Titelbaum and Kopec ms.) have made the case that the relationship between Uniqueness and conciliatory views is much more complicated.…”

Section: Uniqueness's Relation To Other Views In Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Uniqueness Thesis

Kopec

Titelbaum

2016

Philosophy Compass

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The Uniqueness Thesis holds, roughly speaking, that there is a unique rational response to any particular body of evidence. We first sketch some varieties of Uniqueness that appear in the literature. We then discuss some popular views that conflict with Uniqueness and others that require Uniqueness to be true. We then examine some arguments that have been presented in its favor and discuss why permissivists (i.e., those who deny Uniqueness) find them unconvincing. Last, we present some purported counterexamples that have been raised against Uniqueness and discuss some possible reasons why proponents of Uniqueness might find these similarly unconvincing.

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Section: Different Forms Of Uniquenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Uniqueness's Relation To Other Views In Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Uniqueness Thesis

Kopec

Titelbaum

2016

Philosophy Compass

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“…That UP is unsusceptible to the arbitrariness objection is not a new point: Ballantyne and Coffman (, p. 663 ff. ), Horowitz (, footnote 20), Schoenfield (), White (), and Weisberg (forthcoming) all appreciate that arbitrariness‐style worries are not effective against versions of permissivism that deny the possibility of acknowledged permissive cases.…”

Section: The Arbitrariness Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unacknowledged Permissivism

Smith

2020

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes towards some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says that permissivism is true but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an attractive view: It is compatible with the intuitive motivations for permissivism and avoids a significant challenge to permissivism: the arbitrariness objection.

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“…According to proponents of uniqueness, a total body of evidence permits only one rational doxastic attitude: for a given proposition p, "there is just one rationally permissible doxastic attitude one can take, given a particular body of evidence" (White 2014, 312). Uniqueness is a strong thesis; it is stronger than evidentialism, which says that S is justified (not necessarily required) to take a doxastic attitude to p iff taking that attitude is epistemically fitting, given her total evidence (Ballantyne and Coffman 2012). White (2014) has argued that cases where IFs play a large role in belief formation are akin to ingesting a pill that randomly leads to a belief that p nor not-p, or swallowing a pill that would randomly lower your credence that p to .1 or increase it to .7.…”

Section: Irrelevant Influences On Philosophical Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Religious Beliefs and Philosophical Views: A Qualitative Study

Cruz¹

2018

Res Phil.

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Philosophy of religion is often regarded as a philosophical discipline in which irrelevant influences, such as upbringing and education, play a pernicious role. This paper presents results of a qualitative survey among academic philosophers of religion to examine the role of such factors in their work. In light of these findings, I address two questions: an empirical one (whether philosophers of religion are influenced by irrelevant factors in forming their philosophical attitudes) and an epistemological one (whether the influence of irrelevant factors on our philosophical views should worry us). My answer to the first question is a definite yes, my answer to the second, a tentative yes.

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Conciliationism and Uniqueness

Cited by 42 publications

References 15 publications

The Uniqueness Thesis

The Uniqueness Thesis

Unacknowledged Permissivism

Religious Beliefs and Philosophical Views: A Qualitative Study

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