Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government‐led renegotiation

Guasch, J. Luis; Laffont, Jean‐Jacques; Straub, Stéphane

doi:10.1002/jae.987

Cited by 165 publications

(120 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…The nature and scope of this type of renegotiation is very different from government renegotiation with the service provider under centralized contracting, which generally, as in our model, relates to squeezing out a financial advantage. See for exampleGuasch et al (2003Guasch et al ( , 2005 for evidence of this latter type of renegotiation.…”

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confidence: 96%

Delegation of Contracting in the Private Provision of Public Services

Bennett

Iossa

2006

Rev Ind Organ

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We use an incomplete-contract approach to compare contracting out by a public sector agency with the delegation of contracting out to a public-private partnership (PPP) that is a joint venture between private and public sector agents. The PPP maximizes a linear combination of profit and social benefit. Such delegation may be desirable to curb innovations that reduce the cost of provision but also reduce social benefit. Delegation may be undesirable for innovations that increase social benefit but also raise costs. Our results are explained in terms of the shadow cost of public funds and the negotiating stance of the PPP. Copyright Springer 2006delegation, Private Finance Initiative, public private partnership, public service provision, H11, L33,

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confidence: 96%

Delegation of Contracting in the Private Provision of Public Services

Bennett

Iossa

2006

Rev Ind Organ

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“…Guasch et al discuss a "typical" case where a newly elected political authority, seeking voter approval, unilaterally decides either to dishonor the initial contract's toll increases or to lower existing tolls (Guasch, Laffont, and Straub 2006). The authors formalize such renegotiations, finding that contract designs, inadequate regulatory frameworks, deficient institutional environments, and external shocks all increase the probability of government-initiated concession renegotiations.…”

Section: A Survey Of Empirical Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Renegotiation of Transportation Public-Private Partnerships: The US Experience

Gifford

Bolaños

Daito

2014

International Transport Forum Discussion Papers

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT FORUMThe International Transport Forum at the OECD is an intergovernmental organisation with 54 member countries. It acts as a strategic think-tank, with the objective of helping shape the transport policy agenda on a global level and ensuring that it contributes to economic growth, environmental protection, social inclusion and the preservation of human life and well-being. The International Transport Forum organises an annual summit of Ministers along with leading representatives from industry, civil society and academia. Discussion PapersThe International Transport Forum's Discussion Paper Series makes economic research, commissioned or carried out at its Research Centre, available to researchers and practitioners. The aim is to contribute to the understanding of the transport sector and to provide inputs to transport policy design.ITF Discussion Papers should not be reported as representing the official views of the ITF or of its member countries. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the authors.Discussion Papers describe preliminary results or research in progress by the author(s) and are published to stimulate discussion on a broad range of issues on which the ITF works. AbstractPublic-private partnerships (P3s) typically rely on long-term contracts between participants. When conditions arise that fall outside the expectations embodied in the contract, one party may seek to renegotiate the contract terms. Globally, the frequency of P3 contract renegotiations has been sufficient to raise questions regarding why these events occur and what their consequences are for the projects and society. The literature highlights four relevant causes behind renegotiation occurrences: unexpected exogenous changes, the complexity of the contractual relationship, winner´s curse and rent seeking behavior. This study examines the US experience with highway P3 renegotiations, including four types of event: contract modifications, defaults, bankruptcies and buyouts. While the US highway P3 market has grown gradually, failure to understand renegotiations and their potential consequences may dampen the market and adversely affect national infrastructure investment efforts. The analysis finds that insufficient evidence exists to disentangle the drivers of renegotiation in the US, although exogenous changes and contractual relationship complexity appear to be paramount. The analysis highlights th...

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“…subject to constraints (9), (10), (11) and (12). Decreasing the probability   that type  pays a tax relaxes the incentive constraint (9).…”

Section: Lemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

Design of investment promotion policies

Kartasheva¹

2012

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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Over the last 20 years, developing countries have experienced the massive shift of financing and the operation of infrastructure from the public to the private sector. The paper analyzes how the government agency should structure the investment promotion policy. I develop a sequential contracting model between the government, investors and infrastructure providers and derive several properties of the optimal policy. The policy leaves investors uncertain about the project type and prescribes different levels of government support, in the form of tax or price distortions. However, the optimal policy does not change the expectations of investors about distribution of project returns. I characterize how the optimal policy depends on the revenue generation preferences of the government and the profitability of infrastructure projects in the country. Abstract Over the last twenty years, developing countries have experienced the massive shift of financing and the operation of infrastructure from the public to private sector. The paper analyzes how the government agency should structure the investment promotion policy. I develop a sequential contracting model between the government, investors and infrastructure providers and derive several properties of the optimal policy. The policy leaves investors uncertain about the project type and prescribes different levels of government support, in the form of tax or price distortions. However, the optimal policy does not change the expectations of investors about distribution of project returns. I characterize how the optimal policy depends on the revenue generation preferences of the government and the profitability of infrastructure projects in the country.

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Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government‐led renegotiation

Cited by 165 publications

References 39 publications

Delegation of Contracting in the Private Provision of Public Services

Delegation of Contracting in the Private Provision of Public Services

Renegotiation of Transportation Public-Private Partnerships: The US Experience

Design of investment promotion policies

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