Conceptualizing identification: A comment on Downs, Bowman, and Banks (2017).

Abstract

and Banks (2017) noted, researchers use the term "identification" to refer to a variety of different types of measures that actually seem to assess quite disparate subconstructs. These authors proposed that identification should be seen as a polythetic construct and reported data assessing the validity of 6 different subconstructs making up a comprehensive model of identification. However, we propose that this conceptualization of identification is premature. First, given the diversity of the subconstructs, it would likely be difficult to give a precise definition of identification in this model, and we question whether identification is a useful term if it cannot be defined in a specific way. Second, we argue that it is not clear what "family resemblance" there is between these subconstructs that justifies their inclusion in a polythetic model of identification, and note that identification lacks the qualities of other more commonly accepted polythetic constructs, such as self-esteem and experiential avoidance. Finally, we argue that the data reported does not demonstrate that these subconstructs relate to a broader construct in a uniform way. We propose that rather than including these diverse approaches to measuring identification as subconstructs in a polythetic model, researchers should label their measures more specifically, allowing us to test important hypotheses about whether and how these different types of measures relate to each other and to outcomes of interest. Further research is needed to evaluate whether identification is a truly polythetic term before encouraging further confusion of terms in this subfield. Public Policy Relevance StatementSuccessful communication requires that members of a community share common understandings of the meaning of the terms they use. Downs et al. (2017) set forth a polythetic model of identification, but we argue that this line of thinking may further muddle how media researchers use the term "identification." Instead, we suggest that researchers label constructs more specifically so that all members of the community have a shared understanding of what is being measured.

Response to “Conceptualizing identification: A comment on Downs, Bowman, and Banks (2017)”.

“…In fact, an interesting area of future research might be to more carefully understand potential variance in the six identification mechanisms from the study by Downs et al (2017) as a function of channel and content-and along with this, observing variance in identification scores as a function of the engagement (or nonengagement) of these different mechanisms. Put simply, we agree with McDade-Montez and Dore (2020), in that patterns observed in the Downs et al (2017) article might be unique to video games, but we do not see this as a concern, given that (a) the original article was explicitly focused on video games, and (b) the concepts in PID are media-agnostic. Said another way, considering the relationship between identification (as a temporal shift to adopt desired qualities) and its anteceding mechanisms sets up a framework for examining exactly those questions of differences in media formats (along with other relevant variables).…”

“…We recognize that the invitation and opportunity to respond is both an important and a necessary component in maintaining best practices in scholarly debate and in scientific research, and we eagerly engage the process.To recapitulate, McDade-Montez and Dore (2020) are concerned that Downs, Bowman, and Banks' (2017) assertion that identification can be considered a polythetic construct is premature for three reasons: (a) the lack of a formalized definition of identification, (b) conceptual challenges with identification being polythetic, and (c) empirical challenges with data supporting a polythetic architecture for identification (the Polythetic Identification Scale, or PID). We recognize our colleagues' concerns on all three points and indeed, on some aspects of their critique, we feel that McDade-Montez and Dore (2020) and Downs et al (2017) are more aligned in their thoughts than what might appear. On other points, we counter our colleagues' concerns by offering clarifications to the Downs et al (2017) article.…”

“…In rereading the article, we concede that the section "Identification in Digital Spaces" of the original article could have more clearly pointed to a formal definition of the construct under scrutiny. However, it is a misrepresentation to suggest that the article by Downs et al (2017) advocates "abandon[ing] the idea of defining identification" (McDade-Montez & Dore, 2020). Such a claim is neither explicitly stated nor implied in the original article.…”

“…To recapitulate, McDade-Montez and Dore (2020) are concerned that Downs, Bowman, and Banks’ (2017) assertion that identification can be considered a polythetic construct is premature for three reasons: (a) the lack of a formalized definition of identification, (b) conceptual challenges with identification being polythetic, and (c) empirical challenges with data supporting a polythetic architecture for identification (the Polythetic Identification Scale, or PID). We recognize our colleagues’ concerns on all three points and indeed, on some aspects of their critique, we feel that McDade-Montez and Dore (2020) and Downs et al (2017) are more aligned in their thoughts than what might appear. On other points, we counter our colleagues’ concerns by offering clarifications to the Downs et al (2017) article.…”

“…On other points, we counter our colleagues’ concerns by offering clarifications to the Downs et al (2017) article. Our responses to the three main points follow the general structure of McDade-Montez and Dore’s (2020) commentary.…”