The following is a response to "Conceptualizing Identification: A Comment on Downs, Bowman, and Banks." We wish to thank the editors of Psychology of Popular Media Culture for the opportunity to respond as well as our colleagues for their lively critique and discussion. We recognize that the invitation and opportunity to respond is both an important and a necessary component in maintaining best practices in scholarly debate and in scientific research, and we eagerly engage the process.To recapitulate, McDade-Montez and Dore (2020) are concerned that Downs, Bowman, and Banks' (2017) assertion that identification can be considered a polythetic construct is premature for three reasons: (a) the lack of a formalized definition of identification, (b) conceptual challenges with identification being polythetic, and (c) empirical challenges with data supporting a polythetic architecture for identification (the Polythetic Identification Scale, or PID). We recognize our colleagues' concerns on all three points and indeed, on some aspects of their critique, we feel that McDade-Montez and Dore (2020) and Downs et al. (2017) are more aligned in their thoughts than what might appear. On other points, we counter our colleagues' concerns by offering clarifications to the Downs et al. (2017) article. Our responses to the three main points follow the general structure of McDade-Montez and Dore's (2020) commentary.