Conceptualizing Adaptive Preferences Respectfully: An Indirectly Substantive Account

Terlazzo, Rosa

doi:10.1111/jopp.12062

Cited by 46 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…For an explicitly perfectionist account, see Nussbaum (1992). Although she claims that her account ceases to be perfectionist in later work (Nussbaum 2006) see Terlazzo (2014) for argument that her account remains perfectionist. For other perfectionist adaptive preference theorists who share the political project, see Stoljar 2000 and Deneulin 2002.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…I do not intend what follows to convince anyone sympathetic to perfectionism to reject it, since a much fuller discussion of the issues would be required for that project. I have undertaken a more complete discussion elsewhere (Terlazzo 2014), 6 and intend what follows to situate rather than justify my non-perfectionist project.…”

Section: Are Adaptive Preferences Characterized By Absence Of Perfectmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Adaptive preferences: merging political accounts and well-being accounts

Terlazzo

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Accounts of adaptive preferences are of two kinds: well-being accounts fully theorized for their own sake and political accounts theorized to facilitate the political project of reducing oppression and marginalization. Given their practical role, the latter are often less fully theorized, and are therefore less robust to theoretical criticism. In this paper, I first draw on well-being accounts to identify the well-theorized elements that political accounts should want to adopt in order to strengthen their project and avoid common criticisms. Second, I appeal to the political project to show the shortcomings of the well-being accounts on which I draw.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Are Adaptive Preferences Characterized By Absence Of Perfectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptive preferences: merging political accounts and well-being accounts

Terlazzo

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…5 These worries have also plagued the debate about the usefulness of the concept of adaptive preferences (cf. Terlazzo 2016). 6 This was thought of as necessary even by classical Marxists and many second-wave feminists.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does False Consciousness Necessarily Preclude Moral Blameworthiness?: The Refusal of the Women Antisuffragists

Wilson

2021

Hypatia

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Social philosophers often invoke the concept of false consciousness in their analyses, referring to a set of evidence-resistant, ignorant attitudes held by otherwise sound epistemic agents, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating them to perpetuate, structural oppression. But there is a worry that appealing to the notion in questions of responsibility for the harm suffered by members of oppressed groups is victim-blaming. Individuals under false consciousness allegedly systematically fail the relevant rationality and epistemic conditions due to structural distortions of reasoning or knowledge practices, undermining their status as responsible moral agents. But attending to the constitutive mechanisms and heterogeneity of false consciousness enables us to see how having it does not in itself render someone an inappropriate target of blame. I focus here on the 1889 antisuffragist manifesto “An Appeal against Female Suffrage,” arguing that its signatories, despite false consciousness, satisfy both conditions for ordinary blameworthiness. I consider three prominent signatories, observing that the irrationality characterization is unsustainable beyond group-level diagnoses, and that their capacity to respond appropriately to reasons was not compromised. Following recent work on epistemic injustice, I also argue that culpable mechanisms constituted their false consciousness, rendering them blameworthy for the Appeal.

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“…It counts as something that persons may have reasons for an adapted preference and are acting with autonomy, although this is not a sufficient reason to accept the reasoning behind adaptive preferences. Nevertheless, if, when the obstacles that contribute to adaptive preferences are removed, the person still holds preferences that are unhealthy, it may be tragic but the decision should not only be accepted but be respected (Khader, 2011;Terlazzo, 2016).…”

Section: Applications Of Adaptive Preferences For Nursing Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Adaptive preferences continues to be a concept of interest as well as controversy among philosophers and scientists (see Terlazzo, 2016). Engel (2017) suggested expanding the concept of preference to differentiate between various adaptive states (namely beliefs, choices, desires, and values) to guide more appropriate intervention approaches.…”

Section: From Philosophy To Scientific Inquirymentioning

confidence: 99%