Conceptual note on state, trait, and the state–trait distinction.

Abstract

In response to recent controversy over the empirical and conceptual viability of the state-trait distinction, the conceptual bases of the distinction are explicated, with the conclusion that the distinction, though more complex than previously appreciated, is conceptually viable. Rather than attempting to reduce the state-trait distinction to a single dimension, I propose four overlapping but distinct dimensions as underlying current professional uses of the distinction: duration, continuous versus reactive manifestation, concreteness versus abstractness, and situational causality versus personal causality. Parallels are drawn between these dimensions and aspects of the broader concepts of occurrence and disposition, and the concepts of state and trait are described as applications in psychology of these broader concepts. It is argued that a clearer understanding of the concepts of state and trait will facilitate theory and research. Allen and Potkay (1981) mounted an attack on the state-trait distinction, alleging that it is "arbitrary" in practice and in principle. Zuckerman (1983) defended the distinction, reiterating criteria he had earlier proposed (Zuckerman, 1976) for the empirical discrimination of state and trait scales and providing evidence that some currently available scales meet these criteria. This article, too, is prompted by the Allen and Potkay argument, but is in a conceptual rather than an empirical vein. The position taken here is that if by "arbitrary" Allen and Potkay mean that state and trait cannot in principle be consistently distinguished, they are mistaken; on the contrary, psychologists and lay persons alike are able to make this distinction clearly, usefully, and reasonably consistently.In this article, I address only conceptual definition and clarification; the argument is only that it is possible to give a consistent interpretation to the concepts of state and trait and to distinguish clearly between them. No empirical argument is made for the actual existence of entities corresponding to these concepts or for the explanatory value of such entities (cf. Hogan, DeSoto, & Solano, 1977). Nor are the methodological issues involved in demonstrating the existence of states or traits (e.g., Epstein, 1979Epstein, , 1980 addressed. Of course, if no psychologists believed that states or traits exist, that they have explanatory value, or that they are possible to identify empirically, then a consistent conceptual understanding of the terms would be of little or no interest. Definitions of unicorns or phlogiston, no matter how clear, are of no current scientific importance. However, it is evident that the concepts of state and trait, though challenged (W. Mischel, 1968), continue to be widely used in the psychological literature, and to be of interest even to those who challenge them (e.g., W. Mischel & Peake, 1982).I thank James R. Averill for his indispensible assistance in the development of this article. I also thank Mary L. Haake for contributions to the development and writing, and W. Do...

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