Conceptual Information Permeates Word Learning in Infancy.

Abstract

Three experiments document that conceptual knowledge influences lexical acquisition in infancy. A novel target object was initially labeled with a novel word. In both yes-no (Experiment 1) and forced-choice (Experiment 2) tasks, 2-year-olds' subsequent extensions were mediated by the conceptual description of the targets. When targets were described as artifacts, infants extended on the basis of shape. When targets were described as animates, infants extended on the basis of both shape and texture. Experiment 3 revealed similar results for 1.5-year-olds. These results challenge the notion that expectations in word learning (e.g., the "shape bias") (a) emerge late and (b) rest entirely on correlations between perceptual object features and words. Instead, the results indicate that both perceptual and conceptual information permeate word learning in infancy.

Category label effects on Chinese children’s inductive inferences: Modulation by perceptual detail and category specificity

“…Their results are consistent with ours in Experiment 1 (photographs) and with those of Deák and Bauer (1995), Deák and Bauer (1996). Moreover, several studies found that the shape bias-common in object-word extension tasks-could be eliminated in some cases (e.g., Booth, Waxman, & Huang, 2005;Cimpian & Markman, 2005). For example, Cimpian and Markman (2005) reported that the shape bias can be reduced by adding another comparison item or by increasing the complexity of the objects.…”

Children’s Label-Learning Experience within Superordinate Categories Facilitates their Generalization of Labels for Additional Category Members

“…It should be acknowledged that if our hypotheses are supported, our findings would also be consistent with a competing conceptualization of children's label-learning strategies, one positing that children's mapping behavior is influenced by their ontological understanding of the categories (e.g. Bloom, 2000;Booth & Waxman, 2002a/b;Booth et al, 2005;Gelman, 1988;Keil, 1994;Mandler & McDonough, 1998). Its proponents argue that children exhibit a shape bias "not because of a direct correlation with categories, but because [shape] is causally related to deeper conceptual qualities of objects from a broad range of ontological categories" (Booth & Waxman, 2002a; p. B13; see also Bloom & Markson, 1998;Soja et al, 1991).…”

“…For example, previous research (e.g. Booth & Waxman, 2002;Jones et al, 1991;Shutts, Markson, & Spelke, 2009;Waxman & Huang, 2005) suggests that the superordinate category of animals is organized by shape and texture, meaning it encompasses numerous basic-level categories of shape-similar objects and/or texture-similar objects. Other perceptual features might be relevant to labeling within the basic or subordinate categories nested within the superordinate category of animals.…”

Teleological reasoning about nature: intentional design or relational perspectives?

“…However, a full consideration of PT raises two paradoxes. The first is developmental: there is considerable evidence that infants spontaneously distinguish animate beings from artifacts [21,22] and that young children reason precociously about animates and other natural kinds, as compared to artifacts [23,24]. Why, then, would children conflate animate beings with artifacts when it comes to reasoning about purpose?…”