Conceptual gaps and odd possibilities

Sturgeon, Scott

doi:10.1093/mind/108.430.377

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…An important critique of the canonical way to state the problem of mental causation in general, and of the causal exclusion argument in particular, has been developed by Sturgeon (1998Sturgeon ( , 1999. By highlighting an ambiguity in the argument's formulation, the author's argument bridges the dialectical gap between the causal exclusion argument and the supervenience argument.…”

Section: Sturgeon's Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Distinction Between Cause-Cause Exclusion and Cause-Supervenience Exclusion

Harbecke

2013

Philosophical Papers

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This paper is concerned with the connection between the causal exclusion argument and the supervenience argument and, in particular, with two exclusion principles that figure prominently in these arguments. Our aim is, first, to reconstruct the dialectics of the two arguments by formalizing them and by relating them to an anti-physicalist argument by Scott Sturgeon. In a second step, we assess the conclusiveness of the two arguments. We demonstrate that the conclusion of both the causal exclusion argument and the supervenience argument (a negation of the so called 'non-identity premise') is not tantamount to the claim that all mental events are identical to physical events and that a cause-supervenience exclusion principle is actually required for the validity of the first stage of the supervenience argument. Moreover, we show that this new exclusion principle makes an epiphenomenalism with respect to mental events an impossible position, and that there are good reasons to believe in its falsity, rendering the supervenience argument inconclusive.

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Section: Sturgeon's Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Distinction Between Cause-Cause Exclusion and Cause-Supervenience Exclusion

Harbecke

2013

Philosophical Papers

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“…Several authors (Baker 1998;Sturgeon 1998Sturgeon , 1999 have attempted to defend a more nuanced version of the two-event dual explanandum reply that avoids Kim's rejoinder to Dretske. Central to this tactic is the suggestion that the mental event is a higher level event which is irreducible to basic physical properties.…”

Section: The Two-event Dual Explanandum Replymentioning

confidence: 99%

On Kim’s exclusion principle

Campbell

Moore

2008

Synthese

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In this paper we explore Jaegwon Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion. Kim's support for the principle is clarified and we critically evaluate several versions of the dual explananda response authors have offered to undermine it. We argue that none of the standard versions of the dual explananda reply are entirely successful and propose an alternative approach that reveals a deep tension in Kim's metaphysics. We argue that Kim can only retain the principle of explanatory exclusion if he abandons his longstanding critique of nonreductive physicalism.

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Exclusion

Lim¹

2015

God and Mental Causation

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Conceptual gaps and odd possibilities

Cited by 7 publications

References 2 publications

On the Distinction Between Cause-Cause Exclusion and Cause-Supervenience Exclusion

On the Distinction Between Cause-Cause Exclusion and Cause-Supervenience Exclusion

On Kim’s exclusion principle

Exclusion

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