Conceptual failure, the Taliban's parallel hierarchies, and America's strategic defeat in Afghanistan

Mahendrarajah, Shivan

doi:10.1080/09592318.2014.893957

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…162 Because the main economic activity in areas under Taliban control is normally farming, ushr is an important source of income. 163 In some areas, this also included the collection of a 10 percent tax from local shopkeepers and other small businesses. 164 On January 28, 2017, the New York Times reported that the Taliban had started to collect bills for Afghan utilities in the provinces of Kunduz and Helmand.…”

Section: Taxationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opportunity Structures, Rebel Governance, and Disputed Leadership: The Taliban’s Upsurge in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan, 2011–2015

Terpstra

2020

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Even though Kunduz province in Afghanistan was under relatively firm government control in 2011, the Taliban insurgency was able to consolidate its power throughout the province in the years that followed and to temporarily take-over the provincial capital of Kunduz city for the first time since the U.S.-led intervention in 2001. Based on field research in 2013 and 2016, I argue that the Taliban's upsurge took place because of a favorable opportunity structure for the insurgency that coincided with sufficient organizational capacities and a sense of urgency among the Taliban's senior leadership.

show abstract

Section: Taxationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opportunity Structures, Rebel Governance, and Disputed Leadership: The Taliban’s Upsurge in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan, 2011–2015

Terpstra

2020

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Foreign researchers, journalists, aid workers, and diplomats were invited into rebel-controlled territory to see the LTTE's organizational capacities. 163 During this 'tour' 164 the foreigners would usually pass the LTTE checkpoint at Omanthai, which was constructed like a national border, with flags, signs, and armed officers who controlled the vehicles. There would be customs staff in LTTE uniforms to check passports and formal procedures of tax collection would be carried out on vehicles transporting commodities.…”

Section: Performances Of Statehoodmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…162 Interview code 27 C1-Alankerni, Kinniya Division. 163 One of the authors of this article was invited by the LTTE, in his capacity as an academic researcher, to travel into the Vanni in 2004. 164 Although the various observers were aware of the sort of propaganda that this tour entailed, there is fierce debate about how to weigh and interpret these observations.…”

Section: Performances Of Statehoodmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The narrative often includes references to the past, such as the hardships during resistance against the Soviets, the British, Genghis Khan, and Alexander the Great. 163 This nationalistic source of legitimacy gained more prominence in the post-2001 timeframe. The Taliban's interpretation of the post-2001 situation became a religious fight that continued against another 'foreign invader' with a 'puppet' Afghan regime.…”

Section: Moral Forms Of Legitimacymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Rebel Governance and Legitimacy in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka

Terpstra¹

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Introduction CHAPTER 1Although state sovereignty has become the bedrock of the international state system as we know it at the present time, this has certainly not always been the case throughout history (Krasner 1999, Philpott 2001. 3 Yet, it has become common in contemporary political thinking to attribute main governance practices and political authority to sovereign states. From that perspective, rebel groups are an illegitimate and relatively under-recognized governance actor. However, as the case studies in this dissertation show, rebel groups that fight against a sovereign state can themselves also be involved in governance and, thus, acquire political authority. These rebel groups are not internationally recognized states, but they do mimic many state functions that in contemporary history have become directly associated with the sovereign state. These functions include security provision, a judicial system, education, health care, taxation, infrastructure, and utility services. As a result, some geographical territories (for example Northeastern Sri Lanka between 1990-2009) were de jure considered to be part of a sovereign nation state (the Sri Lankan state in this case), but de facto ruled by a rebel group (the LTTE).Rebel governance is not an uncommon phenomenon. Approximately one-third of all insurgencies worldwide between 1945 and 2003 provided health care and/or educational services to the population under their control (Stewart 2014). From Latin-American leftist guerillas to Islamic groups in the Middle East and liberations movements throughout Africa and Asia, rebel groups have been involved in governance (see for example: Arjona et al., 2015). However, involvement in practices of governance is not self-evident for rebel groups. Governing is a costly endeavor filled with obstacles. The implementation of a judiciary system, the collection of taxes, and the provision of costly public goods demand sufficient resources, internal discipline, and coherence in strategy. In order to govern, rebel leaders must divert financial resources away from the military battle towards civilian governance efforts . This also requires rebel personnel that could have been used on the battlefield (Mampilly 2011, p. 62). Particularly under short-term military pressure rebel groups have fewer incentives to focus on a governance agenda, which almost inherently entails longterm investments and decisions (Arjona 2016, pp. 53-54). 4 For short-term gains, it may be more opportune for rebels to travel around and loot the population (Olson 1993). 5 Why then, do rebel groups become involved in governance?Civil war is the common context in which rebel governance takes place. Understanding rebel governance, therefore, requires a focus on the interactions between rebel groups and 3 The European tradition of thought in particular views the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 as an important transition from the dispersed authority of the Middle Ages to an international system of sovereign states (Philpott 2001, pp. 75-96). As a result of thi...

show abstract

Unipolarity and Irregular Warfare: Assessing the Afghanistan Intervention’s Strategic Environment

Rodríguez

2022

Canada and International Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Conceptual failure, the Taliban's parallel hierarchies, and America's strategic defeat in Afghanistan

Cited by 8 publications

References 21 publications

Opportunity Structures, Rebel Governance, and Disputed Leadership: The Taliban’s Upsurge in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan, 2011–2015

Opportunity Structures, Rebel Governance, and Disputed Leadership: The Taliban’s Upsurge in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan, 2011–2015

Rebel Governance and Legitimacy in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka

Unipolarity and Irregular Warfare: Assessing the Afghanistan Intervention’s Strategic Environment

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About