Concepts Out of Theoretical Contexts

Abstract

In this paper we take as our point of departure Kostas Gavroglu and Yorgos Goudaroulis's insight that, in the process of describing and explaining novel phenomena, scientific concepts are taken "out of" their original theoretical context, acquire additional meaning, and become relatively autonomous. We first present their account of how concepts are re-contextualized and, in the process, extended and/or revised. We then situate it within its philosophical context, and discuss how it broke with a long-standing philosophical tradition about concepts. Finally, we argue that recent developments in science studies can flesh out and vindicate the "concepts out of contexts" idea. In particular, historical and philosophical studies of experimentation and cognitive-historical studies of modeling practices indicate various ways in which concepts are formed and articulated "out of context."

Exploratory Concept Formation and Tool Development in Neuroscience

“…By contrast, the role of novel concepts in exploratory experiments is to disclose previously unknown entities or activities or solve problems not characterized by the available theories (Arabatzis and Nersessian 2015; Steinle 2016). To use concepts in this way, researchers actively modify their meaning and reference through operational definitions and tool use in exploratory experiments (Feest 2012; Haueis 2014).…”

“…For example, when Lettvin et al (1959) used microelectrodes to record action potentials from axons in the optic tectum, they held the meaning and reference of "axon" and "action potential" fixed. By contrast, the role of novel concepts in exploratory experiments is to disclose previously unknown entities or activities or solve problems not characterized by the available theories (Arabatzis and Nersessian 2015;Steinle 2016). To use concepts in this way, researchers actively modify their meaning and reference through operational definitions and tool use in exploratory experiments (Feest 2012;Haueis 2014).…”

“…), exploratory experiments articulate the paradigm theory because they help scientists to "choose among alternative ways of applying the paradigm to the new area of interest." This overlooks that, in experimental practice, concepts can acquire their meaning outside their theoretical contexts when researchers apply them to unexpected phenomena (Arabatzis and Nersessian 2015). This is also true for neuroscience.…”

The humanities as conceptual practices: The formation and development of high‐impact concepts in philosophy and beyond

“…Brigandt 2010, 27). The concept of gene acquired this novel meaning because scientists exercised their conceptual capacities to respond to novel issues (Arabatzis and Nersessian 2015).…”

Examining the Structured Uses of Concepts as Tools: Converging Insights

“…1 This type of approach highlights the multiple uses for scientific concepts in practice: from mediating the interplay between theoretical and experimental practices (Feest 2012, Bloch 2012a to contributing to experimental research in ways that are not determined by the theoretical frameworks within which the concepts may also be embedded (Arabatzis 2012). Concepts are shown to be used in theoretically polyvalent ways (Arabatzis, Nersessian 2015, Schmidgen 2014, as useful even when they fail to pick out natural kinds (Bloch 2012b, Waters 2014, and as patchwork arrangements that, having unfolded over generations of historically contingent uses, can resist individual intentions (Kindi 2012, Nersessian 2012.…”