Concentration despite competition: The organizational ecology of technical assistance providers

Morin, Jean‐Frédéric

doi:10.1007/s11558-018-9322-7

Cited by 26 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…The WTO's authority goes far beyond trade, as its rules have implications for a wide range of different issue-areas, making it a "linkage machine" (Alvarez 2002). Indeed, the establishment of the WTO was an important catalyst behind the rise of regime complexes, not just the regime complex for food security analyzed in this study, but also the regime complexes for intellectual property rights (Helfer 2009;Rabitz 2014;Morin 2020), genetic resources (Raustalia and Victor 2004;Gehring and Faude 2014), and the environment (Oberthür and Gehring 2006;Jinnah 2014). The WTO's Agreement on Agriculture expanded its authority into agriculture and food, with the result that its rules have significant implications for world food security (Heri and Häberli 2011;Clapp 2015;Farsund et al 2015).…”

Section: Target Iosmentioning

confidence: 91%

“…Existing theories of IO interaction expect that relationships between IOs that govern similar issue-areas and whose authority overlaps will either be cooperative or competitive (Biermann and Koops 2017;Lipson 2017;Morin 2020). Cooperation among IOs can involve organizations working together toward joint policy or regulatory goals by coordinating their policies and operational activities, pooling their resources, and/or engaging in joint decision-making (Abbott and Snidal 2010;Gehring and Faude 2014;Biermann and Koops 2017).…”

Section: Regime Complexes and Iosmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intervention by international organizations in regime complexes

Margulis

2020

Rev Int Organ

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This article identifies the existence of a previously unknown but important type of self-directed political behavior by International Organizations (IOs) that I term intervention. Intervention occurs when an IO secretariat acts with the intention of altering an anticipated decision at a partially-overlapping IO in a regime complex. Intervention is a distinct type of behavior by IOs that differs from either bureaucratic competition among IOs for mandates, resources and policy influence, or cooperation to achieve joint regulatory goals and enhance performance. I probe the plausibility of intervention through an analysis of three illustrative case studies in the regime complex for food security showing self-directed political actions by the secretariats of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP) and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) directed at altering decision-making by states at the World Trade Organization (WTO). I identify three distinct intervention strategies – mobilizing states, public shaming and invoking alternative legal frameworks – in which IOs utilize their material, ideational and symbolic capabilities to influence decision-making not within their own institutions, but at other, overlapping organizations in a regime complex over which they have no direct control.

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Section: Target Iosmentioning

confidence: 91%

Section: Regime Complexes and Iosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intervention by international organizations in regime complexes

Margulis

2020

Rev Int Organ

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“…This is evident when we examine the other organizations that EU and US agencies cooperate with when they deliver their socialization programmes. Data from Morin (2020) measure the cooperation between different state and non‐state entities in delivering technical assistance programmes from 1995 to 2014, along with their agenda on IPR issues. There are two primary IPR agendas: a maximalist agenda and a minimalist agenda.…”

Section: Promoting the Maximalist Agenda At Different Degreesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, our analysis examines some of the available information on the EU and US’s socialization initiatives within the Asia‐Pacific and more broadly. This work draws primarily on government documents, press statements and websites, as well as data from previous studies (Morin, 2020).…”

Section: Promoting the Maximalist Agenda At Different Degreesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The US and EU’s Intellectual Property Initiatives in Asia: Competition, Coordination or Replication?

Morin

Cartwright

2020

Global Policy

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Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have been a priority for the European Union and the United States. However, over the past two decades, the EU and US have failed to advance their preferred IPRs standards through multilateral forums and have pursued bilateral alternatives instead. How have the EU and US pursued their strategies in this fragmented environment? Looking specifically at the Asia-Pacific, we compare their bilateral initiatives on IPRs across three strategies: treaty-making, coercion and socialization. Through this analysis, we examine whether the EU and US's bilateral actions indicate regulatory competition, coordination or replication. We find that the overall tendency has been towards replication, which raises questions about the reasons for this redundancy and its policy consequences. As the rise of bilateralism is not unique to IPRs, our findings have implications for global governance more generally. Policy Implications • Asian countries negotiating IPRs with the US or the EU should take into account the fact that making concessions to the US is unlikely to reduce pressure from the EU and vice versa, even though concessions made bilaterally benefit IPR holders globally. This makes IPR concessions even less attractive to Asian countries. • EU and US leaders should strive to improve the coordination of their shared goals. When they emulate other countries' interventions, they would gain from assessing the potential marginal contribution generated by an additional intervention. Specialization may be more beneficial than duplication when it comes to resource use. • Asian countries risk paying for EU/US competition over geographical indications because satisfying them both is increasingly difficult. In this context, Asian countries should prioritize multilateralism and support negotiations in multilateral settings, despite their former criticisms of IPR multilateral institutions.

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“…In most foreign countries with fairly intensive construction, state expertise of projects in conjunction with control and supervisory functions over the quality of design and construction is entrusted to special structures of state bodies (Anson et al, 2004;Clarke, 2018;Finkel, 2015;Gruneberg, 2018Matthews et al, 2006Morin, 2018). At the same time, control over project documentation and compliance with the draft requirements of state norms and standards, rules, technical conditions and restrictions is established at the level of legislative acts or municipal regulatory legal acts that should not conflict with national legislation.…”

Section: Review Of Foreign Experience Of the Functioning Of Special Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Features of Expert Activities in the Construction Sector of the Economy: Case of Kazakhstan

Shevyakova¹,

Petrenko²,

Arystan³

et al. 2019

JESR

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The article deals with the functioning of special institutions in the economy of Kazakhstan, as a country with active state participation on the example of the system of state examination of projects and the monopolistic subject of the Republican state enterprise on the right of economic management "State independent departmental examination of projects" (hereinafter RSE "Gosexpertiza"). Construction is recognized as one of the priorities of the Development Strategy of Kazakhstan until 2050 and is one of the most important tasks of a national nature. The quality of the design depends decisively on the efficiency of funds and resources invested in construction, the investment activity of customers, the construction and operational reliability of facilities, their architectural expressiveness, the solution of social, environmental and other problems of society and the state. For entry into the international economic space, it is necessary to introduce international quality standards for facilities under construction.

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Concentration despite competition: The organizational ecology of technical assistance providers

Cited by 26 publications

References 33 publications

Intervention by international organizations in regime complexes

Intervention by international organizations in regime complexes

The US and EU’s Intellectual Property Initiatives in Asia: Competition, Coordination or Replication?

Features of Expert Activities in the Construction Sector of the Economy: Case of Kazakhstan

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