Computational underpinnings of partisan information processing biases and associations with depth of cognitive reasoning

Derreumaux, Yrian; Shamsian, Kimia; Hughes, Brent

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105304

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…This approach goes beyond mere mathematical descriptions of behaviour and aims to understand how individuals make decisions based on available information. For further insights, future investigations may find value in employing a drift diffusion model approach, such as the one proposed by Derreumaux et al 91 and Hause Lin et al 92 . This approach could offer a more comprehensive understanding of the complex factors influencing belief formation and decision-making processes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding belief in political statements using a model-driven experimental approach: a registered report

Perez Santangelo,

Solovey

2023

Sci Rep

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Misinformation harms society by affecting citizens' beliefs and behaviour. Recent research has shown that partisanship and cognitive reflection (i.e. engaging in analytical thinking) play key roles in the acceptance of misinformation. However, the relative importance of these factors remains a topic of ongoing debate. In this registered study, we tested four hypotheses on the relationship between each factor and the belief in statements made by Argentine politicians. Participants (N = 1353) classified fact-checked political statements as true or false, completed a cognitive reflection test, and reported their voting preferences. Using Signal Detection Theory and Bayesian modeling, we found a reliable positive association between political concordance and overall belief in a statement (median = 0.663, CI95 = [0.640, 0.685]), a reliable positive association between cognitive reflection and scepticism (median = 0.039, CI95 = [0.006, 0.072]), a positive but unreliable association between cognitive reflection and truth discernment (median = 0.016, CI95 = [− 0.015, 0.046]) and a negative but unreliable association between cognitive reflection and partisan bias (median = − 0.016, CI95 = [− 0.037, 0.006]). Our results highlight the need to further investigate the relationship between cognitive reflection and partisanship in different contexts and formats. Protocol registration The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 22 August 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/EBRGC.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding belief in political statements using a model-driven experimental approach: a registered report

Perez Santangelo,

Solovey

2023

Sci Rep

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“…Despite the similar learning rates, the early partisan bias had a lasting impact throughout the experiment given that, by the end of the experiment, the trust gap between reliable and unreliable sources (i.e., learning effect) was substantially larger for neutral compared to partisan sources (see Supplements). This finding suggests accuracy-motivated partisans who hold biased prior impressions about partisan sources require more time and a larger amount of evidence to successfully identify credible sources compared to individuals that have no prior biases (Derreumaux et al, 2022(Derreumaux et al, , 2023).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motivated reasoning or biased prior impressions: Updating trust towards partisan sources based on evidence

Lois,

Tsakas,

Riedl

2023

Preprint

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A prominent explanation for the growing trend of belief polarization in political issues is that people engage in motivational reasoning to affirm their ideology and to protect their partisan identities. An alternative explanation is that people seek the truth but use partisanship as an a-priori criterion of what constitutes a credible source of political information. In two experiments, we test these competing explanations by employing a dynamic setting where accuracy-motivated individuals can gradually learn which partisan source is credible based on evidence. In each round, Democrats and Republicans are asked to update their prior estimations about a neutral or a politically relevant topic based on information they receive from another partisan (i.e., ingroup or outgroup source). Both partisan groups initially trusted ingroup sources more than outgroup sources, a pattern that was stronger among partisans with high affective polarization. However, across rounds, this identity bias declined, or even changed direction, as supporters of both groups gradually learned to trust reliable sources more than unreliable sources irrespective of source’s partisanship. Importantly, the partisanship of the sources and the political relevance of the shared information did not affect the learning rate. In contrast, the strength of evidence regarding sources’ actual reliability influenced the learning rate. These findings demonstrate that partisans do not exhibit a persistent motivation to protect their identities. Although they exhibit an initial bias in trusting partisan sources, they are motivated by accuracy and, in the presence of strong evidence, they gradually learn to trust credible sources irrespective of partisanship.

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“…In addition, motivational forces may contribute to the formation of asymmetric learning orders. Recent research has found that people sample information about in-group members first, and more frequently, than information about out-group members (Bergh & Lindskog, 2019;Derreumaux et al, 2022Derreumaux et al, , 2023.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Across one's lifetime, as well as during smaller time intervals, people typically encounter majority and ingroup members before encountering minority and outgroup members. Even when access to group members is not restricted, people choose to sample information about the in-group first (Bergh & Lindskog, 2019;Derreumaux et al, 2022Derreumaux et al, , 2023.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Formation of Negative Attitudes Toward Novel Groups

Woitzel,

Alves

2024

Psychol Sci

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People perceive out-groups, minorities, and novel groups more negatively than in-groups, majorities, and familiar groups. Previous research has argued that such intergroup biases may be caused by the order in which people typically encounter social groups. Groups that are relatively novel to perceivers (e.g., out-groups, minorities) are primarily associated with distinct attributes that differentiate them from familiar groups. Because distinct attributes are typically negative, attitudes toward novel groups are negatively biased. Five experiments ( N = 2,615 adults) confirmed the generalizability of the novel groups’ disadvantage to different aspects of attitude formation (i.e., evaluations, memory, stereotyping), to cases with more than two groups, and to cases in which groups were majority/minority or in-groups/out-groups. Our findings revealed a remarkably robust influence of learning order in the formation of group attitudes, and they imply that people often perceive novel groups more negatively than they actually are.

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Computational underpinnings of partisan information processing biases and associations with depth of cognitive reasoning

Cited by 7 publications

References 57 publications

Understanding belief in political statements using a model-driven experimental approach: a registered report

Understanding belief in political statements using a model-driven experimental approach: a registered report

Motivated reasoning or biased prior impressions: Updating trust towards partisan sources based on evidence

The Formation of Negative Attitudes Toward Novel Groups

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