1991
DOI: 10.1007/bf01123528
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Computational Analysis of the initial stage of the accident at the Chernobyl' atomic power plant

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

1994
1994
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
6

Relationship

0
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 10 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 0 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…In the report of the USSR State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy and in the IAEA official report, the Chernobyl nuclear accident was classified as a reactivity-induced accident (RIA) caused by a complex of factors: the physical characteristics of the reactor, the specific design features of the control elements (poor design of absorbers and non-optimal channels grid), and the unauthorized state of the reactor (USSR, 1986;IAEA, 1992). The aforementioned reports and publications (Abagyan et al, 1991;Afanas'eva et al, 1994;Fletcher et al, 1988) consider that the accident commenced after activation of the Emergency Protection System button (EPS-5), followed by a fast increase of the core temperature and a dramatic increase of neutron power and reactivity, and culminated with two explosions, the last of which destroyed the reactor (IAEA, 1992). These reports were reticent about the nature of the explosions, which presented the biggest issue of the accident.…”
Section: Chernobyl Npp Unit 4 Accidentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the report of the USSR State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy and in the IAEA official report, the Chernobyl nuclear accident was classified as a reactivity-induced accident (RIA) caused by a complex of factors: the physical characteristics of the reactor, the specific design features of the control elements (poor design of absorbers and non-optimal channels grid), and the unauthorized state of the reactor (USSR, 1986;IAEA, 1992). The aforementioned reports and publications (Abagyan et al, 1991;Afanas'eva et al, 1994;Fletcher et al, 1988) consider that the accident commenced after activation of the Emergency Protection System button (EPS-5), followed by a fast increase of the core temperature and a dramatic increase of neutron power and reactivity, and culminated with two explosions, the last of which destroyed the reactor (IAEA, 1992). These reports were reticent about the nature of the explosions, which presented the biggest issue of the accident.…”
Section: Chernobyl Npp Unit 4 Accidentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The data obtained suggest that the errors are substantially larger than the regression coefficients α ij . This indicates that, in our case, it is possible to use the additive approximation (2) The results of the calculations were used to assess the influence of the degree of conversion (the fraction of the reacted aluminum and iron oxides forming the sacrificial material) on the inversion of the oxide and metal phases of the core melt. The inversion condition corresponds to the intersection line of the surfaces in Fig.…”
Section: Analysis and The Choicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Severe accidents at the TMI nuclear power plant [1] and at the fourth unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant [2], as well as a number of other accidents at nuclear power and special plants, have emphasized clearly that solving the problems associated with the safety of nuclear reactors determines prospects for the development of the entirety of nuclear power engineering. In this respect, the design of reliable systems for localization of a core melt and fission products in beyond design-basis accidents of tank-type watercooled nuclear reactors is an important problem in the development of nuclear power engineering within the next few years.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%