Computation and Human Experience

Abstract

This book offers a critical reconstruction of the fundamental ideas and methods of artificial intelligence research. Through close attention to the metaphors of artificial intelligence and their consequences for the field's patterns of success and failure, it argues for a reorientation of the field away from thought in the head and towards activity in the world. By considering computational ideas in a large, philosophical framework, the author eases critical dialogue between technology and the social sciences. AI can benefit from an understanding of the field in relation to human nature, and in return, it offers a powerful mode of investigation into the practicalities of physical realization.

Connectionism and Classical Conditioning

“…Brazeal, 2002;Brooks, 1999;Webb & Consi, 2001), from whence has become enormously influential. Most developments that have occurred in the general field of embodied cognitive science (e.g., Agre, 1997;Clark, 1997;Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991;Wilson, 2004) can be traced back to the synthetic approach in robotics, which in turn has its roots in pioneering work in cybernetics (e.g., Ashby, 1960;Grey Walter, 1963;Wiener, 1948). Braitenberg (1984) has argued that the synthetic approach is likely to produce simpler theories or models than those developed within the more popular analytic tradition.…”

From action to discourse: The bridging function of gestures

“…One might ask, "Do similar relationships between activity, gestures, and speech exist in the development of individual human beings?" Deictic gestures (pointing), too, may be an important aspect of embodied communication based on the observation that deixis and deictic representation are core aspects of cognition (Agre, 1997;Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997).…”

Doble articulación y ciencias cognitivas de tercera generación: desafiando las nociones tradicionales en torno a la experiencia musical acusmática

“…Los científicos que han construido el edificio de este enfoque argumentan que una teoría cognitiva debe incluir tanto el entorno del agente, como la experiencia del agente en ese entorno (Agre 1997;Clancey 1997;Clark 1998;Pfeifer y Scheier 1999;Varela et al 1991;Dawson, Dupuis y Wilson 2010). Reconocen que esa experiencia depende de cómo el entorno es percibido (situación), que la situación de un agente depende de su naturaleza física (corporización) y que un agente corporizado puede actuar sobre y cambiar su entorno ( El enfoque corporeizado sustituye la noción de que la cognición es representación (el pensamiento como una relación de lenguaje) por la noción de que la cognición es el control de las acciones en el entorno.…”