The concept of intelligent software is flawed. The behaviour of software
depends upon the hardware that interprets it. This undermines claims
regarding the behaviour of theorised, software superintelligence. Here
we characterise this problem as “computational dualism”, where instead
of mental and physical substance, we have software and hardware. We
argue that to make objective claims regarding performance we must avoid
computational dualism. We propose using an alternative based upon
pancomputationalism, which defines all aspects of the environment as
nothing more than relations between otherwise irreducible states. We
formalise systems as behaviour (inputs and outputs, with policy being a
causal intermediary), and cognition as embodied, embedded, extended and
enactive. The result is cognition formalised as a part of the
environment, rather than as a disembodied policy interacting with the
environment though an interpreter. This allows us to make objective
claims regarding intelligence, which we argue is the ability to
“generalise”, identify causes and adapt. We then propose objective
upper bounds for intelligent behaviour.