Comprehensive Disclosure of Compensation and Firm Value: The Case of Policy Reforms in an Emerging Market

Abstract

compensation information , comprehensive disclosure , agency conflict , board independence , self-selection bias ,

Determinants and value relevance of UK CEO pay slice

“…Finally, different studies (e.g. Cheung et al 2011;and Sheu et al 2011) examine the effect of corporate governance disclosure on firm value and their findings are consistent with the argument of Healy et al (1999). In particular, they find a positive association between corporate governance disclosure and firm value.…”

“…This suggests that the quality of corporate governance affects stock market participants when valuing firms. Sheu et al (2011) focus only on one particular type of corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. information related to compensation paid to directors and executives).…”

“…In the present study, we follow Cheung et al (2011) and Sheu et al (2011) and consider corporate governance practice, measured by corporate governance ratings, when examining the association 4 Among the six provisions, four limit shareholder rights (staggered boards, limits to shareholder amendments of bylaws, supermajority requirement for merger and charter amendment) and the other two make potential hostile takeover more difficult (poison pills and golden parachute). Therefore, higher index score implies that the firm is entrenched, or has weak governance.…”

Value Relevance of Voluntary Risk Disclosure Levels: Evidence from Saudi Banks

“…It has been contended by Rhodes and Soobaroyen (2010) that disclosure can limit the raise of agency conflicts by diminishing information asymmetry, consequentially augments market valuation of firms. Sheu et al, (2010) stipulated that the capital market only supplies higher firm valuations to firms, which opt for a more inclusive disclosure policy. Gordon et al, (2010) provided strong evidence that greater levels of voluntary disclosure are positively related with the valuation of the firm.…”

An Assessment of Mandatory Disclosure in the Annual Reports of Serbian Listed Companies

“…Brickley et al [5], indicate that mandatory manager compensation disclosure improves corporate governance by public monitoring and rewards to executives such that the disclosure interests are consistent with the creation of shareholders value. Besides, the transparency of directors' compensation information is to signal good governance mechanism that can reduce the cost of capital and increase firm value [42], [43]. Within this group, information on the disclosure of interim financial reports was also taken as a measure of transparency and timeliness of information provision.…”