Composition of Government Budget, Non‐Single Peakedness, and Majority Voting

Bearse, Peter; Glomm, Gerhard; Janeba, Eckhard

doi:10.1111/1097-3923.00079

Cited by 15 publications

(19 citation statements)

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“…Bearse, Glomm and Janeba [2001] show that the median voter result fails when the tax rate is fixed but voters decide between income redistribution and public education. See also Austen-Smith and Wallerstein [2003], who analyze a model in which the poor are divided on the level of affirmative action.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 93%

The Politics of Public Provision of Education

Levy

2005

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

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Public provision of education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution in kind. However, does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as well? I analyze a two-dimensional model of political decision-making with endogenous political parties. Society chooses both the tax rate and the allocation of the revenues between income redistribution and public education. Agents differ in their income and in their age, where young agents prefer public education and the old prefer income redistribution. I find that when the cohort size of the young is not too large then public education arises as a political compromise between the rich and the young segment of the poor. They collude in order to reduce the size of government (which benefits the rich) and target some of its resources to education (which benefits the young poor). When the cohort size of the young is too large, however, income redistribution crowds out public provision of education in the political equilibrium. Copyright (c) 2005 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 93%

The Politics of Public Provision of Education

Levy

2005

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

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“…The present approach contrasts with Bearse et al (2001) who examine transfers and public education, both of which are financed by a proportional income tax, and voting is on the composition of government expenditure for a given tax rate. However, individuals decide whether to use the publicly provided education or buy private education, which leads to double-peaked preferences where the single crossing condition can be violated.…”

Section: Choice Of Education and Transfer Paymentmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…For example, Borck (2007), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) considered redistributive expenditure and Tridimas (2001) and Tridimas and Winer (2005) look at expenditure on public goods. However, Bearse, Glomm, and Janeba (2001) examined majority voting over a transfer payment and public education, conditional on the tax rate, in a static framework. Creedy and Moslehi (2009) examined majority voting over government expenditure on transfer payments as well as public goods, with endogenous incomes, again within a static framework.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The composition of government expenditure with alternative choicemechanisms

Creedy

Moslehi

2013

New Zealand Economic Papers

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This paper investigates the choice of the composition of government expenditure using both positive and normative approaches. The former involves aggregation over selfish voters (simple majority voting and stochastic voting are examined), while the latter involves the choice by a single disinterested individual (considered to maximise a social welfare function). The approach allows direct comparisons of the choice mechanisms. The structures examined include a transfer payment combined with a pure public good, and a transfer payment with tax-financed education. Explicit solutions are obtained for the choice of expenditure components, and these are shown to depend on the proportional difference between the arithmetic mean and another measure of location of incomes, where the latter depends on the choice mechanism. In each case the expenditure composition depends on an inequality measure defined in terms of the proportional difference between a measure of location of the income distribution and the arithmetic mean, where the location measure depends on the decision mechanism.

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“…Bearse et al (2001), who examined majority voting over a uniform transfer and public education, also assumed that the tax rate is given exogenously.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Optimal Division of Government Expenditure Between Public Goods and Transfer Payments

Creedy

Moslehi

2010

Australian Economic Papers

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This paper examines the optimal ratio of transfer payments to expenditure on public goods, for a given income tax rate. The transfer payment is then determined by the government's budget constraint. The optimal ratio of transfers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a function of the ratio of the median to the arithmetic mean wage, and of the tax rate. Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated with reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with increases in the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to public goods, because of adverse incentive effects. Copyright 2010 The Authors. Journal compilation 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/University of Adelaide and Flinders University.

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Composition of Government Budget, Non‐Single Peakedness, and Majority Voting

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

The Politics of Public Provision of Education

The Politics of Public Provision of Education

The composition of government expenditure with alternative choicemechanisms

The Optimal Division of Government Expenditure Between Public Goods and Transfer Payments

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