Complications of a Common Language: Why it is so Hard to Talk about Autonomous Weapons

Abstract

In the past years, a growing number of voices are calling for urgent discussion on weapon systems with increasing autonomy. The discourse on these emerging technologies takes place at the political level under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) but the issue is also widely reflected upon in academic articles, conference papers, (governmental) reports and other papers. As the issue of autonomous weapons is multifaceted and multidisciplinary, the community involved in the discourse is too. What all of these actors have in common, however, is that they are all part of a discourse within which semantic disputes are prominent. Although different terms are suggested to describe autonomous weapons, a number of terms stand out. Particularly prominent terms are 'autonomy', 'target selection and attack' and 'human intervention'. These terms are the basis of a widely used and broadly accepted definition describing autonomous weapons as weapons that are capable of selecting and attacking targets without human intervention. At first glance, the definition and language seem quite clear; nevertheless, upon further examination this definition reveals a number of complications. The aim of this paper however is not to propose a definition that would solve linguistic disputes (if such a definition would even be viable); rather it takes a more external perspective with the purpose to illustrate how a common vocabulary can complicate the discourse on autonomous weapons when the terms involved are not commonly understood or lack consistent interpretations. Hence, this article functions as a map for understanding the debate on autonomous weapons-imperative for anyone who would decide to participate in it.

Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account

“…Principle of meaningful human control future weapons systems must preserve meaningful human control over the use of (lethal) force, that is: humans not computers and their algorithms should ultimately remain in control of, and thus morally responsible for relevant decisions about (lethal) military operations. (Article 36, 2015) This principle has attracted a wide consensus among scholars and policy-makers (Knuckey, 2014;Article 36, 2014;Horowitz and Scharre, 2015;Ekelhof, 2017), as "it offers more precision (control versus the somewhat ambiguous conceptual "loop" or the more passive "judgment"), it explicitly emphasizes the quality of control ("meaningful"), and it implicitly accords responsibility to human agents for decisions concerning each individual attack" (Vignard, 2014: 3).…”

“…This principle has attracted a wide consensus among scholars and policy-makers (Knuckey, 2014 ; Article 36, 2014 ; Horowitz and Scharre, 2015 ; Ekelhof, 2017 ), as “it offers more precision (control versus the somewhat ambiguous conceptual “loop” or the more passive “judgment”), it explicitly emphasizes the quality of control (“meaningful”), and it implicitly accords responsibility to human agents for decisions concerning each individual attack” (Vignard, 2014 : 3).…”

Autonomous Weapon Systems Under International Law

“…This is the AWS defining characteristic. The absence of meaningful human control is universally recognized as the main source of moral and ethical issues arising from AWS (Ekelhof, 2017). This phenomenon can be called human-in/out/on-the-loop, reflecting the various levels of human involvement in the decision-making process (Hoven & Santoni de Sio, 2018).…”

Prospects for the global governance of autonomous weapons: comparing Chinese, Russian, and US practices

“…used in media reports to discuss these technologies. Both LAWS and "killer robots" terms emphasize the lethality of AWS (Park, 2020, p. 396; see also Ekelhof, 2017;Taddeo & Blanchard, 2022).…”