Compliance with Mandatory Disclosure Requirements by New Zealand Listed Companies

Transition to IFRS and compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements: What is the signal?

“…This is stressed because it is well documented that companies do not comply with accounting standards' mandatory disclosures (see section 2). This evidence is in line the argument that the existence of legislation and enforcing bodies does not guarantee compliance (Yeoh, 2005). Therefore, the possibility of uniform application of IFRS across different jurisdictions after 2005 has been heavily questioned (Ball, 2006;Nobes, 2006;Larson and Street, 2004;Soderstrom and Sun, 2007;Zeff, 2007;Weetman, 2006), arguing that the implementation of high quality standards [as IFRS claim to be] may not necessarily lead to high quality reporting.…”

“…In contrast to the present study, none of those is focused on a developed country, based on a recent sample. Additionally, with the exception of Ali et al (2004) which is a multi-country study and Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) who examine a sample of 50 companies over a four year period, the remaining studies use significantly smaller samples than the present study. Only the study of Craig and Diga (1998) employs a sample of a similar size (145 companies) although it is a multi-country study.…”

Corporate Governance and Public Reprimand

“…A study by Yeoh (2005) on the compliance behavior of listed companies in New Zealand indicates that the level of compliance with the Listing Requirements of the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) is higher than compliance with Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (FRS). Yeoh (2005) argues that this may be due to the more stringent monitoring and enforcement by NZX. Gao and Kling (2012) made similar conclusion with listed companies in China.…”

Determining Factors of the Level of Disclosure of Information on Business Combinations with the Entry into Force of the Accounting Standard CPC 15

“…In this article, we chose to assign binary values to each information item required, assigning the value "1" if the company disclosed the required information (1), or "0" if it did not disclose the information (0), as adopted by several surveys on disclosure (see, for instance, Botosan, 1997;Devalle & Rizzato, 2012;Shalev, 2009;Yeoh, 2005). Although there are surveys where values are set according to the specificity degree of each information item (see, for instance, Lanzana, 2004;Wiseman, 1982), it is believed that this way of assigning value establishes a certain subjectivity degree not desirable to the survey.…”