Compliance and Individual Sanctions in the Enforcement of Competition Law

Papp, Florian Wagner–von

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44633-2_8

Cited by 17 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 26 publications

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“…We have already seen that while the number of cartels convicted is stagnant, the fines have increased by leaps and bounds. 56 If studied in 5-year periods (Table 2), the fines increased from just over 300 million Euros in the 1990-1994 period to over three billion Euros in the 2000-2004 period: a ten-fold leap. 57 In the 2015-2019 period, it further increased to eight billion Euros, an impressive 250% rise.…”

Section: The State Of Cartels In the Eu And In The Usmentioning

confidence: 99%

Whither Criminal Cartel Enforcement in the EU?

Agrawal¹

2023

Erasmus Law Review

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Cartels have been a persistent problem in the European internal market and despite strong enforcement, cartels continue to exist and be discovered by the Commission. This article proposes that the optimal way to deal with cartels requires the imposition of criminal sanctions against corporates and responsible executives. This is not a novel proposal in itself: the US has had criminal sanctions against cartels for over a century and the UK for a decade. But the EU's unique regulatory and governance structure requires that such a proposal must have a stronger evidentiary basis and must take into account its governance structure. This article does so by analysing statistics on cartel enforcement in the EU and the US to show that fines have not been able to sufficiently deter cartels. Second, normative reasoning based on harm theory, morality of criminalisation and public choice theory is employed to indicate that cartel activities are criminal in nature and that penalising them as such would not amount to overcriminalisation. Third, objective analysis is used to dissect the limitations of fines: when used in isolation they do not target the wrongdoers, are suboptimal and impose social costs. Fourth, it is shown that combining fines with criminal sanctions can help us redress these issues and improve the deterrence levels significantly. Lastly, principles are proposed to ensure that such a proposal considers the varying gravity of cartel activities, and is in sync with the EU's rule of law and governance structure and the Commission's leniency programme.

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Section: The State Of Cartels In the Eu And In The Usmentioning

confidence: 99%

Whither Criminal Cartel Enforcement in the EU?

Agrawal¹

2023

Erasmus Law Review

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Competition Law in EU Free Trade and Cooperation Agreements (and What the UK Can Expect After Brexit)

Papp

2017

European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017

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The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance

Thépot

2019

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The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it provides the theoretical motivation for this book. It explains why the economic theory of considering the firm as a 'black box' integrated the internal and organisational dimensions of the firm into economic thinking. Specialisation of labour, limited information and opportunism of actors are at the heart of the existence of firms. These considerations also justify the need for competition law, metaphorically, to 'open the black box', for a variety of purposes. Secondly, this chapter describes the theoretical and analytical features of the firm and of its boundaries that are essential to determining the substantive reach of competition law vis-a `-vis corporate governance. The so-called 'theory of the firm', in all its variations, explains the existence and the nature of the firm, as well as its boundary with the market. 1 Thirdly, this chapter introduces the agency theory, which focuses on the behavioural implications of bounded rationality within firms, in which ownership and control are separate functions. The agency relationship is the raison d'eˆtre of corporate governance mechanisms, and is designed to reduce the adverse consequences of bounded rationality. The agency relationship will be a core object of analysis in developments on enforcement of competition law. These three aspects will be discussed successively. why does organisation matter?The theory of the firm is based on the argument that the internal organisation of the firm matters for economic efficiency. It explains why a transaction is carried out either within a firm, in the market, or in the framework of a long-term contract 1 'An actual or nominal place where forces of demand and supply operate, and where buyers and sellers interact to trade goods, services, or contracts or instruments, for money or barter' (Businessdictionary .com).

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Compliance and Individual Sanctions in the Enforcement of Competition Law

Cited by 17 publications

References 26 publications

Whither Criminal Cartel Enforcement in the EU?

Whither Criminal Cartel Enforcement in the EU?

Competition Law in EU Free Trade and Cooperation Agreements (and What the UK Can Expect After Brexit)

The Interaction Between Competition Law and Corporate Governance

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