Complexities of electing diverse committees

Coincidence of Condorcet committees

“…It will be interesting to know what happens under the other extension methods known in the social choice literature. We could also investigate cases where some restrictions (gender, quota, skills etc) are made on the composition of the committees as in Ratli and Saari (2014). We expect that, by taking such restrictions into account, this may induce other types of preferences or ways of deriving preferences on committees that could reconcile the candidate approach and the committee approach of the selection of committees.…”

“…This is not the case here. Ratli (2003), Ratli and Saari (2014) studied committee selection by considering at least two dimensions. These authors came to the conclusion that selecting committees could be more complex than we might think.…”

The role of nomination committees in diversifying boards in an emerging market context

“…An example of such an expectation could be the appointment of at least one female committee member. The authors of this article share Ratliff and Saari’s (2014) view and are of the opinion that a homogenous board should intentionally appoint diverse candidates. These individuals should then be invited to serve on the nomination committee following their board appointment.…”

“…Not all companies have female directors or directors of colour serving on their boards and designated committees. Ratliff and Saari (2014) emphasised the importance of electing diverse individuals to committees. They suggested that, in addition to individual decision-makers’ preferences, tacit expectations related to committee membership should be taken into account.…”

Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy

“…Representation-focused rules generally, and the Chamberlin Courant rule specifically, are often considered in the context of selecting diverse committees [25,33]. While there is no clear definition of what a "diverse committee" is, researchers often use this term intuitively, to mean that as many voters as possible can find a committee member that they rank highly (if a voter v ranks some committee member c highly, then we could say that c "covers" the views of v, so some authors speak of "diversity/coverage"; see the works of Ratliff and Saari [68], Bredereck et al [11], Celis et al [16], and Izsak et al [43] for a different view regarding diverse committees). Theorem 4.5 justifies the use of representation-focused rules to seek committees that are diverse in this sense.…”