Complex Cooperative Strategies in Group-Territorial African Lions

Heinsohn, Robert; Packer, Craig

doi:10.1126/science.7652573

Cited by 362 publications

(284 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Evidence of sensitivity to the fact of cooperating was obtained with capuchin monkeys Cebus apella in which food sharing was more likely after coordinating actions than after behaving individually (de Waal and Berger, 2000). Moreover, coordinating actions can sometimes be based on a clear division-of-labor based on different and complementary roles (Boehm, 1992;Boesch and Boesch, 1989;Connor, 2000;Heinsohn and Packer, 1995;Stander, 1992). As a result, individuals may engage in behavior when cooperating that would be ineffectual if performed alone.…”

Section: Cooperation As Social Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Social dimensions can be particularly pronounced when pairs or larger groups coordinate actions for shared outcomes. Real-world examples include group hunting (e.g., in lions Panthera leo, Scheel and Packer, 1991;Stander, 1992; in chimpanzees Pan troglodytes, Boesch and Boesch, 1989; in bottlenose dolphins Tursiops truncatus, Connor, 2000) and intergroup aggression (e.g., in lions: Heinsohn and Packer, 1995;in chimpanzees: Boehm, 1992). In humans, Hutchins (1995) analyzed team navigation as typical of groups working together.…”

Section: Cooperation As Social Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why cooperate?An economic perspective is not enough

Schuster

2004

Behavioural Processes

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Cooperation is usually explained from an economic perspective focused mainly on the tangible outcomes received by individuals that are also dependent on the behavior of others, with little reference to the actual behaviors used when cooperating. The potential consequences of social dimensions associated with cooperative behaviors are minimized in Skinnerian and game-theory models by means of anonymous subjects that behave individually while physically isolated in separate chambers. When cooperation and non-cooperation occur in the real world, however, they are often associated not only with different outcomes but also with different behaviors. Unlike non-cooperation, cooperative behaviors are usually intrinsically social, influenced by the presence and behaviors of familiar partners. Research is described that addresses whether the social dimensions of cooperative actions go beyond mere description of behaviors to also explain why cooperation occurs. One way to resolve the relative importance of economic and social factors for explanations of cooperation is to measure choice between the options of cooperation and non-cooperation. The economic perspective, linked to models derived from game theory, frames the question as a choice determined by differences in tangible outcomes such as food or money that, in evolutionary terms, are surrogates for gains in fitness. From a behavioral perspective, the choice between cooperation and non-cooperation is also determined by social dimensions associated only with cooperation. The influence of social cooperation on preference was examined by means of two rectangular chambers interconnected by a T-maze. In one chamber, pairs of laboratory rats were reinforced with saccharine solution for coordinating back-and-forth shuttling; in the second chamber, a single animal was reinforced for back-and-forth shuttling performed in isolation. With outcomes equalized between the two options, cooperation was preferred by the majority of subjects. Moreover, variation in the relative rate of reinforcement during cooperation was not a strong predictor of choice whereas the level of intra-pair coordination was positively related to preference. Implications of this result are discussed for both method and theory, including the hypothesis that the preference is influenced by intrinsic reinforcements evoked by cooperating. The consequences for evolutionary fitness would then arise not only from tangible outcomes but from the relationships that develop when cooperating even when immediate and tangible pay-offs are absent, insufficient or sub-optimal. The impact of cooperative relationships on fitness may therefore not occur immediately but in the future, and perhaps in another context, when they influence outcomes that have a significant impact on survival and reproduction.

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Section: Cooperation As Social Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Cooperation As Social Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Why cooperate?An economic perspective is not enough

Schuster

2004

Behavioural Processes

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“…They have highly clumped food, although the presence of dangerous weapons may reduce the escalation of con¯icts and may explain why females do not form dominance hierarchies (Packer and Pusey 1982). They also face strong BGC for territories, hunt cooperatively, and show communal infant nursing and cooperative defense against infanticidal males, all of which should favor tolerance (Pusey and Packer 1987b;Packer et al 1990;Heinsohn and Packer 1995). Thus, female lions have relationships like the primate RNT category taken to an extreme.…”

Section: Carnivoresmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution of female social relationships in nonhuman primates

Sterck

Watts

Schaik

1997

Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology

1,092

941

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Considerable interspeci®c variation in female social relationships occurs in gregarious primates, particularly with regard to agonism and cooperation between females and to the quality of female relationships with males. This variation exists alongside variation in female philopatry and dispersal. Socioecological theories have tried to explain variation in female-female social relationships from an evolutionary perspective focused on ecological factors, notably predation and food distribution. According to the current``ecological model'', predation risk forces females of most diurnal primate species to live in groups; the strength of the contest component of competition for resources within and between groups then largely determines social relationships between females. Social relationships among gregarious females are here characterized as Dispersal-Egalitarian, Resident-Nepotistic, Resident-Nepotistic-Tolerant, or Resident-Egalitarian. This ecological model has successfully explained di erences in the occurrence of formal submission signals, decided dominance relationships, coalitions and female philopatry. Group size and female rank generally a ect female reproduction success as the model predicts, and studies of closely related species in di erent ecological circumstances underscore the importance of the model. Some cases, however, can only be explained when we extend the model to incorporate the e ects of infanticide risk and habitat saturation. We review evidence in support of the ecological model and test the power of alternative models that invoke between-group competition, forced female philopatry, demographic female recruitment, male interventions into female aggression, and male harassment. Not one of these models can replace the ecological model, which already encompasses the between-group competition. Currently the best model, which explains several phenomena that the ecological model does not, is a``socioecological model'' based on the combined importance of ecological factors, habitat saturation and infanticide avoidance. We note some points of similarity and divergence with other mammalian taxa; these remain to be explored in detail.

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“…This effect of temperament may thus be more important in risky cooperative interactions such as intergroup encounters where group members join forces against another group (e.g. Huntingford 1976;Heinsohn and Packer 1995;Fairbanks 2001;Nunn and Deaner 2004). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in wild Barbary macaques: factors affecting free partner choice

Molesti

Majolo

2015

Anim Cogn

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A key aspect of cooperation is partner choice: choosing the best available partner improves the chances of a successful cooperative interaction and decreases the likelihood of being exploited.However, in studies on cooperation subjects are rarely allowed to freely choose their partners.Group-living animals live in a complex social environment where they can choose among several social partners differing in, for example, sex, age, temperament, or dominance status.Our study investigated whether wild Barbary macaques succeed to cooperate using an experimental apparatus, and whether individual and social factors affect their choice of partners and the degree of cooperation. We used the string pulling task that requires two monkeys to manipulate simultaneously a rope in order to receive a food reward. The monkeys were free to interact with the apparatus or not and to choose their partner. The results showed that Barbary macaques are able to pair up with a partner to cooperate using the apparatus. High level of tolerance between monkeys was necessary for the initiation of successful cooperation, while strong social bond positively affected the maintenance of cooperative interactions. Dominance status, sex, age and temperament of the subjects also affected their choice and performance.These factors thus need to be taken into account in cooperative experiment on animals.Tolerance between social partners is likely to be a prerequisite for the evolution of cooperation.

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Complex Cooperative Strategies in Group-Territorial African Lions

Cited by 362 publications

References 25 publications

Why cooperate?An economic perspective is not enough

Why cooperate?An economic perspective is not enough

The evolution of female social relationships in nonhuman primates

Cooperation in wild Barbary macaques: factors affecting free partner choice

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