Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks

Orda, Ariel; Rom, Raphaël; Shimkin, Nahum

doi:10.1109/90.251910

Cited by 441 publications

(360 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Many researchers have exploited the noncooperative game theoretic understanding of the TOC in order to explain the bottleneck character of empirical data networks' behavior and suggest potential alternatives to current routing schemes 26,76,153,154,162,164,206,207,243]. Closely related is work on various \pricing"-based resource allocation strategies in congestable data networks 171].…”

Section: Network Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Theory of Collective Intelligence

Wolpert

2004

Collectives and the Design of Complex Systems

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This paper surveys the emerging science of how to design a \COllective INtelligence" (COIN). A COIN is a large multi-agent system where: i) There is little to no centralized, personalized communication and/or control. ii) There is a provided world utility function that rates the possible histories of the full system.In particular, we a r e i n terested in COINs in which e a c h a g e n t runs a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm. The conventional approach to designing large distributed systems to optimize a world utility does not use agents running RL algorithms. Rather, that approach begins with explicit modeling of the dynamics of the overall system, followed by detailed hand-tuning of the interactions between the components to ensure that they \cooperate" as far as the world utility i s concerned. This approach is labor-intensive, often results in highly nonrobust systems, and usually results in design techniques that have limited applicability. In contrast, we w i s h t o s o l v e the COIN design problem implicitly, via the \adaptive" character of the RL algorithms of each of the agents. This approach i n troduces an entirely new, profound design problem: Assuming the RL algorithms are able to achieve high rewards, what reward functions for the individual agents will, when pursued by those agents, result in high world utility? In other words, what reward functions will best ensure that we d o n o t have phenomena like t h e tragedy of the commons, Braess's paradox, or the liquidity trap? Although still very young, research speci cally concentrating on the COIN design problem has already resulted in successes in arti cial domains, in particular in packet-routing, the leader-follower problem, and in variants of Arthur's El Farol bar problem. It is expected that as it matures and draws upon other disciplines related to COINs, this research will greatly expand the range of tasks addressable by human engineers. Moreover, in addition to drawing on them, such a fully developed science of COIN design may provide much insight into other already established scienti c elds, such as economics, game theory, and population biology.

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Section: Network Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Theory of Collective Intelligence

Wolpert

2004

Collectives and the Design of Complex Systems

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“…Devarajan [8] was the first to prove that a continuous flow, user-optimized network is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of pure strategies. In [6], Orda et al considered a communication network shared by several selfish users in which each user seeks to optimize its performance by controlling the routing of its given flow demand. They investigated the Nash equilibria for such a noncooperative game and discussed the issue of convergence to an extent.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, in a certain step, overlay routing allocates traffic on links according to the end-to-end network performance perceived by its users, and in the next step the ISP reallocates the traffic to optimize its objectives. The interaction of such processes can be modeled by game-theoretic approaches [6]. Although the objective mismatch between overlay routing and ISP traffic engineering has been pointed out in previous studies, the majority of the research focuses on ISPs' intra-domain networks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Routing Strategy for Multihomed ISP to Mitigate the Impact of Overlay Traffic

Shao

Hasegawa

Taniguchi

et al. 2013

IEICE Trans. Inf. & Syst.

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Xun SHAO †a) , Student Member, Go HASEGAWA † †b) , Yoshiaki TANIGUCHI † †c) , and Hirotaka NAKANO † †d) , Members SUMMARY Multihoming is widely used by Internet service providers (ISPs) to obtain improved performance and reliability when connecting to the Internet. Recently, the use of overlay routing for network application traffic is rapidly increasing. As a source of both routing oscillation and cost increases, overlay routing is known to bring challenges to ISPs. In this paper, we study the interaction between overlay routing and a multihomed ISP's routing strategy with a Nash game model, and propose a routing strategy for the multihomed ISP to alleviate the negative impact of overlay traffic. We prove that with the proposed routing strategy, the network routing game can always converge to a stable state, and the ISP can reduce costs to a relatively low level. From numerical simulations, we show the efficiency and convergence resulting from the proposed routing strategy. We also discuss the conditions under which the multihomed ISP can realize minimum cost by the proposed strategy.

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“…Before our works involving Strategy Logic, there was no uniform framework to deal with this problem. So far, this question has mainly been addressed algorithmically and for very restrictive game topologies [40]. By means of GRADEDSL, in this paper we show how to address and efficiently solve this problem and in a general way.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extended Graded Modalities in Strategy Logic

Aminof

Malvone

Murano

et al. 2016

Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.

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Strategy Logic (SL) is a logical formalism for strategic reasoning in multi-agent systems. Its main feature is that it has variables for strategies that are associated to specific agents with a binding operator. We introduce Graded Strategy Logic (GRADEDSL), an extension of SL by graded quantifiers over tuples of strategy variables, i.e., "there exist at least g different tuples (x 1 , ..., x n ) of strategies" where g is a cardinal from the set N ∪ {ℵ 0 , ℵ 1 , 2 ℵ 0 }. We prove that the model-checking problem of GRADEDSL is decidable. We then turn to the complexity of fragments of GRADEDSL. When the g's are restricted to finite cardinals, written GRADED N SL, the complexity of model-checking is no harder than for SL, i.e., it is non-elementary in the quantifier rank. We illustrate our formalism by showing how to count the number of different strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria (NE), or subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE). By analyzing the structure of the specific formulas involved, we conclude that the important problems of checking for the existence of a unique NE or SPE can both be solved in 2EXPTIME, which is not harder than merely checking for the existence of such equilibria.

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Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks

Cited by 441 publications

References 14 publications

Theory of Collective Intelligence

Theory of Collective Intelligence

A Routing Strategy for Multihomed ISP to Mitigate the Impact of Overlay Traffic

Extended Graded Modalities in Strategy Logic

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