2018
DOI: 10.1145/3184137
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Competitive Packet Routing with Priority Lists

Abstract: In competitive packet routing games, packets are routed selfishly through a network and scheduling policies at edges determine which packages are forwarded first if there is not enough capacity on an edge to forward all packages at once. We analyze the impact of priority lists on the worst-case quality of pure Nash equilibria. A priority list is an ordered list of players that may or may not depend on the edge. Whenever the number of packets entering an edge exceeds the inflow capacity, packets are processed i… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(35 citation statements)
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References 33 publications
(42 reference statements)
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“…al. [14], we can show that the socially optimal state of a given symmetric game with edge priorities is an earliest arrival flow, too. Similar to the model with player priorities, there is always a socially optimal solution with edge priorities, where players only wait at the source node in an earliest arrival flow in a network with unit capacities due to the fact that an earliest arrival flow fulfills strong flow conservation.…”
Section: Connection To Earliest Arrival Flowsmentioning
confidence: 95%
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“…al. [14], we can show that the socially optimal state of a given symmetric game with edge priorities is an earliest arrival flow, too. Similar to the model with player priorities, there is always a socially optimal solution with edge priorities, where players only wait at the source node in an earliest arrival flow in a network with unit capacities due to the fact that an earliest arrival flow fulfills strong flow conservation.…”
Section: Connection To Earliest Arrival Flowsmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…They focus on the comparison between Nash equilibria and equilibria in a game with full control (subgame perfect equilibria) on acyclic graphs. In the paper at hand, we will use the subordinated tie-breaking of Cao et al [5] as our main criterion in a non FIFO setting similar to the model in Harks et al [14].…”
Section: Pointers To the Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
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