Competitive on-the-job search

Garibaldi, Pietro; Moen, Espen R.; Sommervoll, Dag Einar

doi:10.1016/j.red.2015.10.001

Cited by 14 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 31 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Except for the last contribution, firm size in these models is not restricted by the operated technology, circumventing considerations induced by the difference between average and marginal product. Closely related to our contribution is the work by Garibaldi and Moen (2010) who also consider a competitive search model with heterogeneous firms, deriving a number of new insights for on-the-job search. As they assume constant-returns in production, the only determinant of firm size arises from convex vacancy creation costs, which are assumed to be independent of firm size or productivity.…”

Section: Further Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 98%

“…In the competitive-search literature, job-to-job movements have been considered by Shi (2009), Menzio and Shi (2009, Garibaldi and Moen (2010) and recently Schaal (2010). Except for the last contribution, firm size in these models is not restricted by the operated technology, circumventing considerations induced by the difference between average and marginal product.…”

Section: Further Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…An often used benchmark is the case where firms pay some monetary recruitment cost C(V, L, x) = k(V ) that is strictly increasing and strictly convex, but independent of the current size or productivity (for applications of this specific case, see e.g. Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2007), Koeniger and Prat (2007), Garibaldi and Moen (2010)). The convexity captures adjustment costs that prevent the firm from immediately growing large just by posting many vacancies.…”

Section: Recruitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Menzio and Moen (2010) do not obtain efficiency because they focus on lack of commitment, and Garibaldi and Moen (2010) abstract from decreasing returns.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market

Kaas

Kircher

2015

American Economic Review

134

158

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We develop and analyze a labor search model in which heterogeneous firms operate under decreasing returns and compete for labor by publicly posting long-term contracts. Firms achieve faster growth by offering higher lifetime wages that attract more workers which allows to fill vacancies with higher probability, consistent with empirical regularities. The model also captures several other observations about firm size, job flows, and pay. In contrast to existing bargaining models, efficiency obtains on all margins of job creation and destruction, both with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The planner solution allows a tractable characterization which is useful for computational applications.

show abstract

Section: Further Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Further Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Recruitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Menzio and Moen (2010) do not obtain efficiency because they focus on lack of commitment, and Garibaldi and Moen (2010) abstract from decreasing returns.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market

Kaas

Kircher

2015

American Economic Review

134

158

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The right-hand side shows the gain from having 1/k more units in liquid assets, including the search cost savings of not expanding capacity today. Let D denote the difference between the right-hand-side and the left-hand-side in (17). We say that a high value of a parameter pushes the firm toward liquid assets if D is increasing in the parameter around the bliss point D = 0.…”

Section: Financial Decisions In Partial Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Financial constraints in search equilibrium: Mortensen Pissarides meet Holmstrom and Tirole

2018

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A key lesson from the Great Recession is that firms' leverage and access to finance are important for hiring and firing decisions. It is now empirically established that bank lending is correlated with employment losses when credit conditions deteriorate. We provide further evidence of this and make causal inferences on the effect of leverage on job losses drawing on a new firm-level dataset that we assembled on employment and financial positions of European firms. Yet, in the Diamond Mortensen Pissarides (DMP) model there is no role for finance. All projects that display positive net present values are realized and financial markets are assumed to be perfect. What if financial markets are not perfect? Does a different access to finance influence the firm's hiring and firing decisions? The paper uses the concept of limited pledgeability proposed by Holmstrom and Tirole to integrate financial imperfections and labor market imperfections. A negative shock wipes out the firm's physical capital and leads to job destruction unless internal cash was accumulated by firms. If firms hold liquid assets they may thus protect their search capital, defined as the cost of attracting and hiring workers. The paper explores the trade-off between size and precautionary cash holdings in both partial and general equilibrium. We find that if labor market frictions disappear, so does the motive for firms to hold liquidity. This suggests a fundamental complementarity between labor market frictions and holding of liquid assets by firms.

show abstract

The technological origins of the decline in labor market dynamism

Eeckhout,

Weng

2024

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Competitive on-the-job search

Cited by 14 publications

References 31 publications

Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market

Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market

Financial constraints in search equilibrium: Mortensen Pissarides meet Holmstrom and Tirole

The technological origins of the decline in labor market dynamism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About