Competitive Governance and Displacement Decisions Under Rebel Rule: Evidence from the Islamic State in Iraq

Rebel actors engage in a number of behaviors beyond violent conflict, including social service provision, diplomacy, and establishing local governance. This article centers on an oft-overlooked aspect of rebel behavior and governance: rebel groups conducting popular elections in wartime. We argue that rebel elections are a means through which rebels can strengthen both local and international legitimacy, but that there are risks to employing elections (such as logistical failures or publicized disconnect from civilians). We hypothesize that rebels that are pursuing legitimacy (local and international) in other ways are likely to set up rebel elections and that rebel groups with greater organizational capacity are more likely to introduce elections because they are well placed to manage the risks elections entail. Using a global data set of rebel use of elections where local civilians vote to elect rebel representatives at various levels of organizational hierarchy, we find empirical support for these propositions.

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 54%

Voting for Militants: Rebel Elections in Civil War

Cunningham

Huang

Sawyer

2020

“…As a result, even political institutions that do little while existing primarily on paper can be effective if the intended goal is primarily performative for external observers (Mampilly 2015). In this issue, Revkin (2021) takes the first step toward explaining how effective rebel governance institutions are with respect to civilian attitudes toward the rebel group.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…IS therefore elected to co-opt political institutions, and after establishing clear guidelines and limitations for governance, allowed certain towns to manage themselves at least temporarily. At the same time, it worked to shape political attitudes of the people living in these places, which, alongside other evidence (Revkin 2021), suggests that partial subjugation was not the preferred nor even final political arrangement the rebels would go on to form.…”

Section: Partial Subjugation: the Ismentioning

confidence: 92%

A Typology of Rebel Political Institutional Arrangements

Mampilly

Stewart

2020

What are the different political institutions rebels create to engage captive civilian populations, and how do they arrive at distinct political arrangements? Rebel-controlled territories host a diversity of political institutions ranging from structures designed to promote democratic decision-making to martial law. Although previous research has focused on rebel social service provision and other aspects of rebel governance, few have investigated variation in the institutional arrangements rebels adopt. In this article, we identify a set of four dimensions along which rebel political institutions vary leading to six ideal–typical forms of political arrangements. We argue that an iterative and dynamic stepwise process, determined by rebel group strategies and local conditions, produces one of these political institutional outcomes. Importantly, the type of rebel political institutions within one location can change throughout the war, and variation sometimes emerges across territories the same rebel group controls. We demonstrate the plausibility of our arguments through a series of illustrative case studies that correspond to the formation processes of our six ideal–typical political arrangements. We conclude with recommendations for future research.

“…For this reason, groups choose among a variety of strategies to mobilize support, encourage cooperation, and prevent defection (Mampilly 2011, 54;Moore 1995;Weinstein 2006). Governance provision is one strategy through which rebel groups can strengthen civilian perceptions of group legitimacy which in turn influences civilian mobilization and support (Förster 2015, 204;Revkin 2021).…”

Section: Rebel Governance and Rule Of Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rebel Justice during Armed Conflict

Loyle

2020

Research on rebel behavior focuses on the violent conduct of these groups. Work on rebel governance, however, has documented the myriad ways in which rebel groups seek to gain legitimacy, project strength, and govern civilian populations beyond direct violence. These efforts stress the importance of governance institutions for securing cooperation and compliance from the civilian population, a central concern for rebel groups. Judicial processes are one avenue through which this cooperation and compliance can be secured. These efforts encompass a range of processes including ad hoc trials, truth commissions and commissions of inquiry, offers of amnesty, and reparations programs. Using new data on the rebel use of judicial processes from 1946 to 2011, I examine the argument that rebel judicial processes can best be understood as a mobilization strategy by the group, offering concessions to a supportive civilian population or coercion when support is weak.