Competitive dual-collecting regarding consumer behavior and coordination in closed-loop supply chain

Wang, Nengmin; Song, Yanfei; He, Qidong; Jia, Tao

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2020.106481

Cited by 58 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…For example, the authors of [5] dealt with a closed-loop supply chain with two dual channels-a forward dual-channel where a manufacturer sells a product to customers through traditional retail channel and e-tail (internet) channels, and a reverse dual-channel where the used items are collected for remanufacturing through the traditional third party logistics and e-tail channel. Reference [10] considered consumers might choose the online collection service provided by third-party platforms for convenience and explore the influence of consumer behavior on the competitive dual-collecting supply chain. With the spread of digitalization, a virtual logistics company plays a very important role, not only in a regular supply chain, but also in some emerging supply chain areas.…”

Section: Closed-loop Supply Chains With Remanufacturingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With the rapid development of smart logistics, the recycling model of waste products has gradually shifted to the Internet Plus recycling, and the way of third-party recycling occupies an increasingly important position. Reference [10] considered consumers might choose the online collection service provided by third-party platforms for convenience, which also brings competition to other channels. To explore the influence of consumer behavior on the competitive dual-collecting supply chain.…”

Section: Competition In Remanufacturingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input

Liu

Yuan

et al. 2020

Applied Sciences

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Increasing attention to sustainable development issues and recycling are forcing the recyclers to use different incentives to capture more market share. Recycling innovation input is one of the effective topics in reverse competitive chains. Because of the importance of this issue, firstly, a basic closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system is discussed that includes an integrated manufacturer and a third-party collector. Then the impact of the integration with the innovation input into third-party product collectors is considered. Eventually, two models are constructed. The first model is a basic model that includes an integrated manufacturer and one third-party collector with innovation investment. The other model is the hybrid model that includes an integrated manufacturer and two third-party collectors with and without innovation input. Stackelberg game models are used to study the optimal pricing strategies for all three models and players’ attitudes toward different scenarios. Finally, numerical analysis is presented. Our findings are generated on the following three aspects. The collector’s recycling choice, recycling innovation input, and influence on recyclers and manufacturers. It is found that the manufacturer will always choose to recycle and prefers the hybrid recycling market, which depends on the rate of collection and the compensation from production-collecting. Moreover, the results reveal that the highest return rate of recyclers occurred under the hybrid model. However, the recyclers may not be able to invest the sustainable recycle innovation input under the exorbitant innovation barriers.

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Section: Closed-loop Supply Chains With Remanufacturingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Competition In Remanufacturingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input

Liu

Yuan

et al. 2020

Applied Sciences

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“…Second, supply chain coordination, which is devoted to aligning incentives and improving supply chain entities' performance, has always been an important topic [6,7,13,19,26,27,28,30,37,40,45,50,53]. Various types of coordination contracts and mechanisms (e.g., wholesale price contracts, revenue-sharing contracts, twopart tariff contracts) can be found in previous studies.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zheng et al [53] investigate pricing and coordination strategies in a dual-channel CLSC with considering different channel power structures. Wang et al [45] investigate product collection strategy and coordination in a CLSC with considering consumer behavior and competitive dual-recycling channels. In this study, we incorporate a RS (revenue-sharing) contract and a TPT (two-part tariff) contract into a Stackelberg game and emphasize the impacts of take-back regulation within a CLSC.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of take-back legislation on pricing and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain

Zheng

Hong

2022

JIMO

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This study investigates the effects of take-back legislation and channel structures on pricing, collection, and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). By establishing the centralized, manufacturer-led, and retailer-led CLSC models, we analyze the equilibrium solutions of channel players and the government. We obtain the following results. (1) The manufacturer can accept a higher collection target and exit the market later in the centralized model than in decentralized decision-making models. Moreover, the manufacturer exists the market earlier in the retailer-led model with regulation compared with the manufacturer-led model. (2) The government's optimal collection target is the same under manufacturer-led and retailer-led models when the regulation comes into force. (3) Revenue-sharing and two-part tariff contracts can effectively coordinate manufacturer-led and retailer-led CLSCs under take-back legislation. Finally, we conduct several numerical examples and obtain relevant managerial insights. Our results indicate that the correlation between take-back legislation and channel structure has a significant impact on the pricing and coordination decisions of the CLSC; furthermore, the government should flexibly set the collection target when facing different supply chain and channel power structures in a CLSC.

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“…Zheng et al (2019) proposes three coordination mechanisms to allocate surplus profit and examines the effects of retailer's fairness concerns on profit allocation [48]. uses revenue sharing contracts and two-part tariff contracts to coordinate the reverse channels in two CLSC models [35]. As mentioned before, the revenue sharing contract is always used to coordinate the supply chain in the study by most scholars, which ignores the recovery costs and reverse channel investments.…”

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confidence: 99%

Collection decisions and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain under recovery price and service competition

Dai

Zhang

2022

JIMO

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With the increasing growth of consumers' request for recovery channels, in addition to collecting price, the collecting service has gradually become a competitive point for collectors to collect used products. Focusing on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with recovery competition (on collecting price and collecting service) and distinguishing collecting quality, we propose two models (decentralized and centralized models) to study the collection strategies and profits of the CLSC. Moreover, we analyze the impact of the collecting competition and quality on the CLSC. Finally, a revenue-cost sharing contract (RCSC) is introduced to coordinate the supply chain. And a numerical example is illustrated to verify the contract's efficiency. It is found that the collected quantities and profits of the CLSC members are positively correlated with the remanufacturable ratio. The collecting competition dampens consumers' enthusiasm for recycling, which is not conducive to collectors to carry out collecting activity, resulting in the reduction of the CLSC's profit. The collectors appropriately improving collecting prices and service levels can increase the collected quantities, but to cope with the increasing competition, increasing collecting price is the main means for collectors to attract consumers to recycle. In addition, the designed RCSC can effectively improve the CLSC's efficiency and increase the profits of each party.

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Competitive dual-collecting regarding consumer behavior and coordination in closed-loop supply chain

Cited by 58 publications

References 32 publications

Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input

Competing Reverse Channels’ Performance with Sustainable Recycle Innovation Input

Effects of take-back legislation on pricing and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain

Collection decisions and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain under recovery price and service competition

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