Competitive, cooperative and Stackelberg congestion pricing for multiple regions in transportation networks

Zhang, Xiaoning; Zhang, H.M.; Huang, Hai; Sun, Lijun; Tang, Tie-Qiao

doi:10.1080/18128602.2010.502547

Cited by 44 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…This is in contrast to other authors (Xiao et al, 2007;Yang et al, 2009) who assume that the private operators play a single shot game in both determining tolls and capacities simultaneously based on a Nash game. Thus our work relates closely to that of Zhang et al (2011), and extends our own recent work reported in Gühnemann et al (2011Gühnemann et al ( , 2014 and Koh et al (2012).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 85%

Cordon toll competition in a network of two cities: Formulation and sensitivity to traveller route and demand responses

Watling

Shepherd

Koh

2015

Transportation Research Part B: Methodological

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a b s t r a c tWhile there exists extensive literature on the first-and second-best tolling of congested transportation networks, much of it presumes the existence of a single agent responsible for toll-setting. The present paper extends the small but growing body of work studying the impact of several agents independently regulating tolls on different parts of a network. Specifically we consider the problem of a network consisting of two 'cities', each city independently regulated by a city 'authority' able to set a single cordon toll for entry to the city. It is supposed that each authority aims to maximise the social welfare of its own residents, anticipating the impact of its toll on travellers' route and demand decisions, while reacting to the toll level levied by the other authority. In addition, we model the possibility of the cities entering into a 'tax-exporting agreement', in which city A agrees to share with city B the toll revenues it collects from city B residents using city A's network. It is assumed that the sensitivity of travellers, in terms of their route and demand responses, is captured by an elastic demand, Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE) model. Conditions for a Nash Equilibrium (NE) between cities are set out as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC). It is shown that weaker, 'local' solutions to the EPEC (which we term LNE for local NE) satisfy a single variational inequality, using the smooth implicit function of the SUE map. Standard variational algorithms may then be used to identify such LNE solutions, allowing NE solutions to be identified from this candidate set; we test the use of a Sequential Linear Complementarity Problem algorithm. Numerical results are reported in which we see that the sensitivity of travellers may affect many factors, including: the number of LNE solutions, the initial conditions for which algorithms might determine such solutions, the gap between LNE and a global regulator solution, and the incentive for cities to cooperate in terms of tax-exporting.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 85%

Cordon toll competition in a network of two cities: Formulation and sensitivity to traveller route and demand responses

Watling

Shepherd

Koh

2015

Transportation Research Part B: Methodological

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“…Summarizing modeling methodologies, for the individual stakeholder group, user equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, spatial price equilibrium or compensation principle was frequently used, while Stackelberg game or multi-leader-follower game was applied to multi-level games. In particular, Zhang et al (2011) explored competitive, cooperative and Stackelberg congestion pricing for local regions. Practical pricing schemes in competitive and collaborative circumstances between different administrative regions of the network were presented employing both Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg game.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal decision making process of transportation service providers in maritime freight networks

Lee

Choo

2015

KSCE J Civ Eng

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The paper presents a bi-level modeling approach for capturing hierarchical relationships among major carriers and finding carrier decision-making processes in maritime freight networks. Carriers are transportation service providers and generally include OC (Ocean Carrier), LC (Land Carrier) and PTO (Port Terminal Operator). They make pricing and routing decisions at each part of the intermodal freight system and have sequential relationships. OCs are considered as the leaders in maritime shipping markets since they generally choose both PTOs and LCs. The individual carrier group determines the optimal service cost and route that give the greatest profit. Hierarchical interactions between OCs and PTOs/LCs are captured in a bi-level model. The concept of multi-leaderfollower game is applied to the bi-level game, assuming multiple and competitive leaders.

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“…Zhang and Yang [14] developed a method of simultaneously determining optimal locations and toll levels of cordon-based congestion pricing. Zhang et al [15] studied the cooperation and competition congestion pricing policy among multiple regions. We refer interested readers to Yang and Huang [16] for details regarding developments in road pricing research.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Design of Transportation Networks with Automated Vehicle Links and Congestion Pricing

Wang

2018

Journal of Advanced Transportation

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We propose a bi-level network design model comprising automated vehicle (AV) links and congestion pricing to improve traffic congestion. As upper-level road planners strive to minimize total travel-time costs by optimizing both the network design and the congestion pricing, lower-level travelers make choices about their routes to minimize their individual travel costs. Our proposed model integrates a network design and congestion pricing to improve traffic congestion and we use a relaxation-based method to solve the model. We conducted a series of numerical tests to analyze the proposed model and solution method. Our results indicate that network design is more effective than congestion pricing when the AV market penetration is high and the opposite is true when AV penetration is low. More importantly, we find that a network design of automated vehicle links with congestion pricing is superior to a single network design or congestion pricing, especially when both AVs and conventional vehicles have a relatively large market penetration.

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Competitive, cooperative and Stackelberg congestion pricing for multiple regions in transportation networks

Cited by 44 publications

References 40 publications

Cordon toll competition in a network of two cities: Formulation and sensitivity to traveller route and demand responses

Cordon toll competition in a network of two cities: Formulation and sensitivity to traveller route and demand responses

Optimal decision making process of transportation service providers in maritime freight networks

Optimal Design of Transportation Networks with Automated Vehicle Links and Congestion Pricing

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