Competition policy vs horizontal merger with public, entrepreneurial, and labor-managed firms

Delbono, Flavio; Rossini, Gianpaolo

doi:10.1016/0147-5967(92)90133-r

Cited by 49 publications

(43 citation statements)

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“…The pioneering theoretical work on mixed oligopoly was done by [1]. Since then, the analysis of mixed market models that incorporate public firms has received increasing attention and has been widely performed by many researchers (see, for example, [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]). 1 As is well known, there has been a worldwide wave of privatization of public enterprises since the nineteen-eighties.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization

Ohnishi¹

2012

M2ECONOMICS

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This paper focuses on the role that production subsidies play in a Bertrand mixed duopoly. The paper examines four regimes: mixed and private duopoly, each with and without subsidies. The results of this study are compared with the findings of the existing Cournot mixed market literature. As a result, the paper shows that that the introduction of production subsidies into the analyses of Bertrand and Cournot mixed markets can improve social welfare.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization

Ohnishi¹

2012

M2ECONOMICS

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“…where f NF (p; L) is the value of the project for the Lth member of the NF , given by (4). By analogy with (5), and, as a result of the above arguments,…”

Section: The Employer Firm (Ef )mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…6 Here, we analyze entry strategies of …rms belonging either to the NFs 5 See the canonical models of Ward (1958), Vanek (1970), the re…nements of Pestieau and Thisse (1979), the empirical scrutiny of Pencavel and Craig (1994), the analysis of LMF oligopolies in Delbono and Rossini (1992), workers' enterprises in Sertel (1993), just to mention few contributions. 6 The theory of the LMF has evolved quite a lot in parallel with the growing success of market economies vis à socialist economies.…”

Section: Lmf the Question Then Boils Down To What Are The Implicatiomentioning

confidence: 99%

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Start-up Entry Strategies: Employer vs. Nonemployer Firms

Moretto

Rossini

2005

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Start-up Entry Strategies: Employer vs. Nonemployer firms SummaryFrom 1997 to 2001 we observe in the Usa a faster growth in the number of Nonemployer firms (NF) vis à vis Employer firms (EF). The diverse speed of net entry may be due to particular internal organisation of the two types of firms and the effect that this has on the reactions to market uncertainty. However, the set of internal organizations of firms is larger than that made up simply by EFs and NFs, in particular among newborn firms, since we observe corporate start-ups with employees, firms owned and managed by their founders who are simultaneously the employees and, finally, non corporate enterprises. The second class of firms mostly belongs to the category of NFs, according to US nomenclature, while non corporate firms may belong to either category. Our curiosity is attracted by different entry patterns of NFs and EFs and our aim is to interpret them. According to recent literature, firms carry out an irreversible investment, such as entry, only if market prices are strictly larger than average total costs (Marshallian point). However, the trigger price that makes firms become active is affected by institutional rules, the existence of profit sharing, efficiency wages, exit options -i.e. partial reversibility -, financial constraints. Then, the internal organization of a newborn firm may make the difference. In a continuous time stochastic environment, where firms bear a sunk cost, we model entry as a growth option. On the trace of distinct objective functions we show that NFs and EFs have specific entry patterns in terms of output price and/or size. Why? Simply because they react in diverse fashions to market price volatility. In this sense we are able to show that, in most cases, the NF is locally less risky. This makes the NF better suited to enter under conditions of higher volatility. This exactly corresponds to what happened during the years between 1997-2001.

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“…However, most studies consider quantity competition, such as [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]. 1 Some studies consider mixed markets with price competition, such as [22][23][24][25][26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly Models with Complementary Goods

Ohnishi¹

2010

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Competition policy vs horizontal merger with public, entrepreneurial, and labor-managed firms

Cited by 49 publications

References 6 publications

Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization

Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization

Start-up Entry Strategies: Employer vs. Nonemployer Firms

Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly Models with Complementary Goods

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