2003
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.456441
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Competition Policy in Latin America

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Cited by 7 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“… See Castaneda (2003), De Leon(2001)andOwen (2003) for recent overviews of competition law and policy in the LAC region.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… See Castaneda (2003), De Leon(2001)andOwen (2003) for recent overviews of competition law and policy in the LAC region.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The latter statement is opposed by the authors of this monograph, in whose view the knowledge of competition law would dispel doubts about the likely anticompetitive behaviour without impeding lawful forms of cooperation between undertakings. This is supported by Owen (2003) who shows for several countries in Latin America that competition laws without enforcement can hardly have an influence on the creation of a competitive culture. Scholarly 4 The average consumer benefits resulting from the work of the Competition Council ranges from 13.24 million € (when only direct financial benefits are included) to 77.73 million € (including deterrence).…”
Section: Cartels and Antitrust Policymentioning
confidence: 86%
“…on average 1.04 million € per year, revealed that the direct benefits to consumers brought by the Competition Council exceeded its annual budget by 12.6 times or by almost 75 times (if deterrence effect is included). statements about the absent or low deterrent effect of antitrust policy are opposed by the latest theoretical works ) and empirical research (Buccirossi et al 2013;Allain et al 2011;Clarke and Evenett 2003;Owen 2003), providing evidence that the development of antitrust policy enforcement strengthens market competition and that strongly enforced antitrust law has a deterrent effect; that is, it is expected to decrease the rate of overcharge and prevent illegal price-fixing behaviour in the future. As stressed by Buccirossi et al (2013), by deterring anti-competitive practices competition policy makes markets work effectively and fosters efficiency, and that good competition policy has a strong impact on total factor productivity 5 growth.…”
Section: Cartels and Antitrust Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Owen (2003), years later, a similar set of concerns, possibly involving electronic tariff publishing and more traditional forms of collusion, arose in Brazil. In August 2003, the presidents of Brazil's four major airlines met together in a hotel.…”
Section: Box 6: Allegations Of Airline Price Fixing In the Us And Bramentioning
confidence: 99%