Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?

Stratmann, Thomas; Francisco, José; Aparicio-Castillo, Francisco J.

doi:10.1007/s11127-006-1252-x

Cited by 81 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…It has a statistically significant negative effect on both the number of contributors per eligible voter and the total amount of contributions per eligible voter. Since the competition variable is coded such that smaller values indicate greater competition, the analysis suggests that as one sees an increase in the level of inter-party competition, one sees an increase in both the number of contributors per eligible voter and in the total amount of all contributions per eligible voter, which is very much in line with findings from previous research (Fuchs et al, 2000;Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo, 2001;Welch, 1980). Based on the analysis indicated in Table 1, if an election becomes more competitive, say from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile, the number of contributors increases by 59.37 percent and the amount of contributions goes up by 63.20 percent.…”

Section: All Contributorssupporting

confidence: 79%

“…In almost all types of elections, incumbents tend to have more contributors and a greater total dollar amount of contributions compared to challengers (Box-Steffensmeier and Dow, 1992;Gross and Goidel, 2003;Snyder, 1990Snyder, , 1993Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo, 2001). It has also been debated whether or not contribution limits have a different effect on incumbents than on challengers (Aranson and Hinich, 1979;Box-Steffensmeier and Dow, 1992;Cox and Magar, 1999;Eom and Gross, forthcoming;Hogan, 2000;Snyder, 1990Snyder, , 1993Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo, 2001). One might also expect that the behavior of contributors is different in open seat races than when there is an incumbent running.…”

Section: Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Democratization Effects of Campaign Contribution Limits in Gubernatorial Elections

Eom

Gross

2007

Party Politics

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Campaign contribution limits have become a common feature of campaign finance reform efforts in most states. The use of contribution limits has been seen as an important mechanism by which to lessen the influence of so-called `special interests' and to encourage citizen participation. Contribution limits could `democratize' the system of contributions by forcing candidates to rely on a larger number of smaller contributions, thereby reducing the value of any single contribution. In this article, we focus on the alleged `democratization' effects of campaign contribution limits. We examine 58 gubernatorial elections in 42 states during the period 1990 to 2000. Analyses of the number of contributors, the total dollar amount of contributions and the average amount given by contributors suggest that contribution limits do have a democratization effect. The nature of the effect, however, depends upon whether one examines all contributors, just particularistic contributors or just individualistic contributors.

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Section: All Contributorssupporting

confidence: 79%

Section: Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratization Effects of Campaign Contribution Limits in Gubernatorial Elections

Eom

Gross

2007

Party Politics

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“…Indeed, it often seems to be the other way around (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder, 2003, p. 120). Consistent with our theory, at the state level Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2006) find campaign finance laws do not affect the rate at which incumbents win elections. policy choice is biased away from the preferences of the electorate.…”

supporting

confidence: 85%

Even If It’s Not Bribery: The Case for Campaign Finance Reform

Daley

Snowberg

2009

SSRN Journal

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We develop a dynamic multi-dimensional signaling model of campaign finance in which candidates can signal their ability by enacting policy and/or by raising and spending campaign funds, both of which are costly. Our model departs from the existing literature in that candidates do not exchange policy influence for campaign contributions, rather, they must decide how to allocate their efforts between policymaking and fundraising. If high-ability candidates are better policymakers and better fundraisers then they will raise and spend campaign funds even if voters care only about legislation. Voters' inability to reward or punish politicians based on past policy allows fundraising to be used to signal ability at the expense of voter welfare. Campaign finance reform alleviates this phenomenon and improves voter welfare at the expense of politicians. Thus, we expect successful politicians to oppose true campaign finance reform. We also show our model is consistent with findings in the empirical and theoretical campaign finance literature. * The authors are indebted to

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“…The first two rows compare states that do and do not limit campaign contributions from corporations and individuals, respectively. I focus on individual and corporate contributions following Besley and Case (2003), Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2006), and Primo et al (2006). As can be seen, congruence is actually 5 percent lower in states that limit corporate contributions, and only 3 percent higher in states that limit individual contributions.…”

Section: Determinants Of Congruence: Election Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach

Matsusaka

2010

QJPS

122

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The quality of government is often measured by the degree of congruence between policy choices and public opinion, but there is not an accepted method for calculating congruence. This paper offers a new approach to measuring policy-opinion congruence, and uses it to study 10 high-profile issues across the 50 states. For the issues examined, states chose the policy preferred by a majority of citizens (equivalent to the median voter outcome) 59 percent of the time -only 9 percent more than would have happened with random policymaking. Majoritarian/median outcomes were 18-19 percent more likely when direct democracy was available, and 11-13 percent more likely when judges were required to stand for reelection. The likelihood of a majoritarian/median outcome was not correlated with a variety of election laws, including campaign contribution limits, public funding of campaigns, and commission-based redistricting.In a democracy, citizen preferences are supposed to play an important role in public policy decisions. Indeed, as Erikson et al. (1993, p. 1) note, "we often gauge the quality of government by the responsiveness of public policymaking to the preferences of the mass public," and scholars and activists continue to search for institutions that will enhance responsiveness. The Downsian model (Downs, 1957) shows that competition between * I received helpful comments from Michael Alvarez, Jonathan Barnett, Christina Gathmann, Tim Groseclose, Andy Hanssen, Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, Jaffer Qamar, anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Stanford University, UC-San Diego, the University of Chicago, and the University of Southern California. candidates can bring policy decisions into alignment with the preferences of the median voter, but the predominant theme of recent research is the many obstacles that stand in the way of citizen control, such as the limited information of voters and representatives (Campbell et al., 1960;Miller and Stokes, 1963;Lupia and McCubbins, 1998;Groseclose and McCarty, 2000), interest groups (Olson, 1965;Stigler, 1971;Peltzman, 1976;Grossman and Helpman, 2001), and legislative structure (Weingast et al., 1981;Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Opinion surveys consistently reveal that most citizens believe government responds more to powerful interests than the general public.Despite its importance for the practice and study of democracy, there is little statistical evidence on the amount of congruence between preferences and policy that actually prevails, and little evidence on how institutions affect the amount of congruence. Numerous studies, such as the well-known contributions of Erikson et al. (1993), Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Bergstrom andGoodman (1973), andStimson et al. (1995) document a correlation between policy and indirect measures of citizen preferences, such as demographic and economic variables or indexes of ideology along a liberal-conservative continuum. 1 While such evidence shows that policies respond at the margin to changes in opinion, several studies ...

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Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?

Cited by 81 publications

References 29 publications

Democratization Effects of Campaign Contribution Limits in Gubernatorial Elections

Democratization Effects of Campaign Contribution Limits in Gubernatorial Elections

Even If It’s Not Bribery: The Case for Campaign Finance Reform

Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach

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