2014
DOI: 10.1109/tnet.2013.2255889
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Competition of Wireless Providers for Atomic Users

Abstract: We study a problem where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their utility functions as well as in the perceived quality of service of individual providers. We model the interaction of an arbitrary number of providers and users as a two-stage multileader-follower game. We prove existence and uniqueness of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a generic channel model and a wide class of users' utility functions. We show that the competition of resource prov… Show more

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Cited by 26 publications
(34 citation statements)
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References 43 publications
(74 reference statements)
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“…To resolve the issue of private information, it is natural to consider a decentralized market solution (e.g., pricing mechanisms [15] and auctions [16]). For instance, in [16], the mobile users determine their data demands by responding to the market price and hence indirectly reveal their private information.…”
Section: Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…To resolve the issue of private information, it is natural to consider a decentralized market solution (e.g., pricing mechanisms [15] and auctions [16]). For instance, in [16], the mobile users determine their data demands by responding to the market price and hence indirectly reveal their private information.…”
Section: Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such a free-rider problem does not occur in wireless communication networks with unicast information (not power) transmissions (e.g. [15], [16]), because the unicast information data are private goods. 3 That is, they are excludable due to message encryption and rivalrous because the data dedicated to one user typically does not benefit another user.…”
Section: Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Authors reveal the advantage for the primary operator to play before the secondary operator, particularly in a high-traffic regime. Furthermore, a two-stage multi-leader-follower game is used to model the interaction of a number of wireless providers and a group of atomic users in [10]. The providers announce the wireless resource prices in a first stage and the users announce their demand for the resource in the second stage.…”
Section: Background and Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In general the game-theoretical modelling of wireless markets is performed either at a microscopic or at a macroscopic level: Microscopic approaches usually focus on specific technical aspects (e.g., protocol, network topology, technology) on a short spatial and temporal scale, often considering networks with a small number of base stations (BSs) and markets with a single provider [11,24,44,14,46,13,48]. The computational and scalability issues when analysing large (e.g., nation-wide) markets become prominent.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%