2007
DOI: 10.1080/08997760701290708
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Competition for Viewers and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly

Abstract: © Dette eksemplar er fremstilt etter avtale med KOPINOR, Stenergate 1, 0050 Oslo. Ytterligere eksemplarfremstilling uten avtale og i strid med åndsverkloven er straffbart og kan medføre erstatningsansvar. CASE -CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES IN ECONOMICSCASE -Centre for Advanced Studies in Economics -is a joint centre for The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH), The Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF) and The University of Bergen (UiB). Research at CAS… Show more

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Cited by 65 publications
(48 citation statements)
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References 28 publications
(22 reference statements)
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“…We follow Kind et al (2007) in assuming that consumer preferences are given by the following quadratic utility function:…”
Section: The Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…We follow Kind et al (2007) in assuming that consumer preferences are given by the following quadratic utility function:…”
Section: The Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The latter is a web page for the Norwegian broadcaster TV2, where consumers can pay for watching various video programs. 18 The most important content on TV2 Sumo is live soccer matches from the Norwegian Premier League ("Tippeligaen"). TV2 has the exclusive right to broadcast these matches, which implies that there are no close substitutes on the Internet.…”
Section: Some Empirical Observationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…What is needed is, firstly, a model of a TV oligopoly, and secondly, a specification of viewer preferences that allows us to distinguish between the pure effect of an increase in the number of firms and the effect of increased similarity between them. Such an analysis is found in Kind, et al (2007), where viewers' preferences are modeled through a representative viewer endowed with a utility from watching TV given by a version of the so-called Shubik-Levitan utility function, originally formulated by Shubik and Levitan (1980): , where U is the representative viewer's utility, V i is the quantity of TV watching consumed by the representative viewer at TV channel i, m is the number of TV channels, and s is a measure of similarity of program content, with s = 1 implying that program contents are identical, whereas s = 0 is the opposite extreme with program content being so different that demand for content from various TV channels is independent.…”
mentioning
confidence: 92%
“…The analysis in Kind, et al (2007) is based on the presumption that TV firms are totally advertising financed and does therefore not allow for a discussion of pay TV, which is the focus of our present concern. The necessary extension is, however, presented in Kind, et al (2009), on which the present discussion is based.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This framework has been applied to several different markets (see table 1 Kind et al 2007;Dewenter & Haucap 2009). Due to their relative closeness to the multisided phenomena on sports markets, we will use insights from advertising-revenue financed media for the purpose of illustrating the more general implications of the multisided markets framework.…”
Section: A Brief Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%