Competition and regulation in the taxi industry

Cairns, Robert D.; Liston‐Heyes, Catherine

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(94)01495-7

Cited by 150 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…They highlight the variability in price in a highly competitive marketplace, inconsistent service quality and the potential for exploitation of individual drivers. There is a body of subsequent research which assesses the value of price and quantity regulation in the taxi industry (Cairns & Liston-Heyes, 1996;Chien & Tsai, 2007;Douglas, 1972;Kim & Wang, 2007;Manski & Wright, 1976;Schaller, 2007;Schroeter, 1983;Seibert, 2006b;Tran & Kleiner, 2005;Wong, Wong, Yang, & Wu, 2008;Yang, Wong, & Wong, 2002). These studies take a variety of approaches to evaluate the impact of regulation, optimal price policies and the optimal allocation of taxicabs to an industry.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 98%

Fareplay: An examination of taxicab drivers’ response to dispatch policy

Massow¹,

Canbolat²

2010

Expert Systems with Applications

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 98%

Fareplay: An examination of taxicab drivers’ response to dispatch policy

Massow¹,

Canbolat²

2010

Expert Systems with Applications

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“…And here we encounter still further difficulties. As Cairns and Liston-Heyes (1996) observe, the Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983) theorem implies that bargaining between a cab driver and potential customer will not in general attain an efficient outcome if neither has an alternative trading partner at the moment (and so are uninformed regarding one another's valuations of trading). On this basis they suggest that regulation could therefore be beneficial in low demand periods.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Taxicab regulation in Japan

Flath

2006

Journal of the Japanese and International Economies

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Flath, David-Taxicab regulation in JapanThis paper proposes a model of a cruising taxicab industry under laissez faire pricing and free entry, and compares it with alternative regimes including collusive fare setting, collusive restrictions on entry, or both. In the model, under laissez faire, prices are determined by Nash bargaining with complete information and lie above marginal costs. Under laissez faire pricing and free entry the average number of vacant cabs need not be efficient and could be either higher than optimal or less, depending upon the relative bargaining power of individual cabs and potential customers. Under collusive control of entry, the average number of vacant cabs will be set at the efficient level given the prices, which if set collusively will be above the laissez faire prices. These findings shed new light on the political success of cartelizing regulation of the cruising taxicab industry such as that observed in Japan.

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“…Zum einen hat die Nutzung eines Taxis, Auswirkungen auf andere potentielle Nutzer von Taxen: Für den marginalen Konsumenten erhöht sich, in Analogie zum "congestion"-Effekt in der Clubgütertheorie (Buchanan, 1965), die Wartezeit (Cairns und ListonHeyes, 1994). Zudem sind die Kosten einer zusätzlichen Fahrt während der Betriebszeit eines Taxis nahezu null (Cairns und Liston-Heyes, 1994 …”

Section: Theoretisches Modell Des Taximarktesunclassified

“…Zu beachten ist, dass durch die Abhängigkeit der Nachfrage von sich selbst, eine Situation entsteht, in welcher es bei einem gegebenen Preis mehrere gleichgewichtige Lösungen der Determinanten Q, N und h gibt (Cairns und Liston-Heyes, 1994 (Cairns und Liston-Heyes, 1994), muss zunächst die Anzahl der Fahrten pro Stunde im Durchschnitt ermittelt werden (Gleichung ( Abbildung 2 lässt sich entsprechend um eine Nullgewinn-Isoprofitlinie ergänzen (Frankena, 1984;S.33). Auch hierbei ergeben sich aufgrund der Abhängigkeit der Nachfragefunktion von sich selbst mehrere Gleichgewichte, die die Nullgewinnbedingung erfüllen und somit auf der NullgewinnIsoprofitlinie verortet sind.…”

Section: Theoretisches Modell Des Taximarktesunclassified

Der deutsche Taximarkt – das letzte (Kollektiv-)Monopol im Sturm der „neuen Zeit“

Pape

Wein

2015

Zeitschrift Für Wirtschaftspolitik

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The increasing number of Smartphone-Apps and web-based tools, e.g. route planners, improve the transparency of taxi rides with regard to prices and routing. Trips can be planned easily and the payment is safe and uncomplicated. These innovations are very important in the recent discussion about the necessity of regulatory intervention in the taxi market. This is mainly because technical innovations reduce asymmetric distributed information between market participants. However, asymmetric information is not the only source of market failure that requires the state to interfere in market activity. The provision of taxis yields an externality that might legitimate market interference. In order to understand the mechanisms and theoretical arguments, the paper refers to a model by Cairns und Liston-Heyes (1994) as well as Frankena (1984) to generate empirically testable hypotheses. Importantly, the empirical part of the paper tests whether the regulator takes the costs structures into account and, therefore, acts for the purpose of either public or private interests. We analyze price differences in 393 tariff regulations with respect to several variables such as urban or rural area, western or eastern Germany, the existence of an airport or a fair, the validity of the tariff regulation as well as the density of population. The results suggest that the regulator for the most of the considered variables takes the cost structures in the taxi market into account. Nonetheless, the population variable seems questionable. The reasons for the puzzling results might refer to different perceptions with regard to waiting time in sparsely populated areas. In sum, the results implicate that technical inventions related to the taxi market do no longer justify an obligatory knowledge test of streets and important places (Ortskundeprüfung). These reforms are likely to revolutionize the mobility market in large cities because the taxies are going to be superseded by livery vehicles (Mietwagen). In order to save the taxi sector from ruin, a regulation of both the taxi and the livery vehicle market seems to be an alternative. Terms of use: Documents in

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Competition and regulation in the taxi industry

Cited by 150 publications

References 13 publications

Fareplay: An examination of taxicab drivers’ response to dispatch policy

Fareplay: An examination of taxicab drivers’ response to dispatch policy

Taxicab regulation in Japan

Der deutsche Taximarkt – das letzte (Kollektiv-)Monopol im Sturm der „neuen Zeit“

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