Competition and corruption: Highway corruption in West Africa

Foltz, Jeremy D.; Li, Kangli

doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2023.103080

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Political risks, such as insecurity, inability to honor regional obligations and corruption are expected to limit the success of the GHP. This is supported by findings of [87][88][89] which indicate that insecurity concerns related to the Ivorian Crisis from 2002-2011 and the Central African Republic civil war caused the abandonment of Abidjan-Ouagadougou-Bamako Corridor in favor of Tema-Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor and led to the Central African Republic's inability to raise counterpart funding toward the implementation of the Douala-Bangui Corridor project. Additionally, bribery has increased operator costs and delivery delays for TTC in Mali, negatively impacting efficiency along these corridors.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 62%

Investigating Risks to the Implementation of the Great Equatorial Landbridge (GELB) Highway Project across Africa

Kazungu,

Sharifi

2023

Sustainability

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Transboundary Trade Corridors (TTC) are becoming increasingly important for achieving national, regional, and global development objectives. However, the cross-boundary nature of these projects involves dealing with diverse contexts that span across different countries and involve multiple stakeholders with varying interests. These circumstances exacerbate the risks and uncertainties that arise during their implementation, intensifying the challenges involved in making decisions about how to proceed with their execution. Insufficient evaluations of development projects have been identified as a contributing factor to unforeseen risks, which in turn can result in the underperformance and failure of transportation infrastructure projects. This ultimately acts as an impediment to achieving sustainable development goals. Further, rapid deployment of post risk-event corrective measures can exacerbate, for instance, macro-economic crisis and civil unrest. The Great Equatorial Land Bridge is a TTC planned to traverse five countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, South-Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Despite the anticipated advantages for globalization, political cooperation, and regional integration, the risks that must be addressed to successfully implement this project are still uncertain. We, therefore, use a Multicriteria Decision-Making (MCDM) framework to investigate risks to its successful implementation. The analysis results highlight that effectively managing economic, political, and geographic risks is crucial for the successful implementation of the project. Policy-makers, contractors and multiple stakeholders will benefit from this study’s depiction of the risks and their relative importance. Results can also inform actions toward sustainable development of the project.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 62%

Investigating Risks to the Implementation of the Great Equatorial Landbridge (GELB) Highway Project across Africa

Kazungu,

Sharifi

2023

Sustainability

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“…Second, our study is related to the broader literature on the economics of illicit mar-kets. One influential subset focuses on the market for government corruption (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Bliss and Di Tella 1997;Ades and Di Tella 1999;Olken and Barron 2009;Amodio et al 2021;Foltz and Li 2021). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue theoretically that corrupt officials should be thought of as profit-maximizing agents and point out that competition between government officials can reduce bribery.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Structure and Extortion: Evidence from 50,000 Extortion Payments

Brown,

Montero,

Schmidt-Padilla

et al. 2024

Review of Economic Studies

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How does gang competition affect extortion? Using detailed data on individual extortion payments to gangs and sales from a leading wholesale distributor of consumer goods and pharmaceuticals in El Salvador, we document evidence on the determinants of extortion payments and the effects of extortion on firms and consumers. We exploit a 2016 nonaggression pact between gangs to examine how collusion affects extortion in areas where gangs previously competed. While the pact led to a large reduction in competition and violence, we find that it increased the amount paid in extortion by approximately 20%. Much of this increase was passed through to retailers and consumers: retailers experienced an increase in delivery fees, leading to an increase in consumer prices. In particular, we find an increase in prices for pharmaceutical drugs and a corresponding increase in hospital visits for chronic illnesses. The results point to an unintended consequence of policies that reduce competition between criminal organizations.

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Competition and corruption: Highway corruption in West Africa

Cited by 2 publications

References 27 publications

Investigating Risks to the Implementation of the Great Equatorial Landbridge (GELB) Highway Project across Africa

Investigating Risks to the Implementation of the Great Equatorial Landbridge (GELB) Highway Project across Africa

Market Structure and Extortion: Evidence from 50,000 Extortion Payments

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