Competition and Coordination in Liberalized African Cotton Market Systems

Poulton, Colin; Gibbon, Peter; Hanyani-Mlambo, Benjamine; Kydd, Jonathan; Maro, W.E.; Larsen, Marianne Nylandsted; Osorio, Afonso; Tschirley, David L.; Zulu, Ballard

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2003.10.003

Cited by 124 publications

(100 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…This underscores the existence of a trade-off between competition and "coordination", as pointed out by Dorward, Poulton, Tschirley and their co-authors in various publications (e. g. Dorward et al 1998 ;Poulton et al 2004 ;Tschirley et al, 2010).…”

mentioning

confidence: 69%

Revisiting the “Cotton Problem”—A Comparative Analysis of Cotton Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa

Delpeuch¹,

Vandeplas²

2013

World Development

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe cotton sector has been amongst the most regulated in Africa, and still is to a large extent in West and Central Africa (WCA), despite repeated reform recommendations by international donors. On the other hand, orthodox reforms in East and Southern Africa (ESA) have not always yielded the expected results. This paper uses a stylised contracting model to investigate the link between market structure and equity and efficiency in sub-Saharan cotton sectors; explain the outcomes of reforms in ESA; and analyze the potential consequences of orthodox reforms in WCA. We argue that the level of the world price and of government intervention, the nature of pre-reform institutional organisation, as well as the degree of parastatal inefficiency, all contribute to making reforms less attractive to farmers and governments in WCA today, as compared to ESA in the 1990s. We illustrate our arguments with empirical observations on the performance of cotton sectors across sub-Saharan Africa.

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confidence: 69%

Revisiting the “Cotton Problem”—A Comparative Analysis of Cotton Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa

Delpeuch¹,

Vandeplas²

2013

World Development

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“…Eventually, the major stakeholders created a local monopoly system in 2000, with each company being assigned exclusive rights over a certain zone. Despite these efforts, cotton production declined further during this Sustain Sci period because of conflicts over zoning rights, poor enforcement of the pricing mechanism, and adverse weather conditions (Poulton et al 2004). The field study in Central Ethiopia took place between January 25 and February 02, 2016 in the Oromia region.…”

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confidence: 99%

Assessing the food security outcomes of industrial crop expansion in smallholder settings: insights from cotton production in Northern Ghana and sugarcane production in Central Ethiopia

et al. 2017

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The current industrial crop (IC) expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) may have important ramifications for food security. This study proposes a rapid appraisal method that can capture the food security outcomes of IC expansion in smallholder settings in SSA. A key element of this approach is a common unit of household caloric intake that captures food security across its four pillars (availability, access, utilization, stability). This approach also considers the role of women in household food security. The proposed approach is tested in two radically different smallholder IC settings: cotton production in Northern Ghana and sugarcane production in Central Ethiopia.

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“…However, transaction costs are particularly high in these markets. Specializing on cash crops often entails high risks due to high input costs, considerable price volatility, and a dependency on one or few large buyers (Poulton et al 2004;Gemech, Struthers 2007). Another barrier to specializing on the production of cash crops that cannot be consumed by the household is high food price volatility, which induces farmers to prioritize on food crop production (Fafchamps 1992).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Traditional Food Crop Marketing in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Gender Matter?

Handschuch

Wollni

2015

The Journal of Development Studies

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Specialization and commercialization of agricultural production is seen as a key to lift small-scale farmers in developing countries out of poverty. While participation in high-value markets has been shown to be beneficial for farmers, especially the smallest and least endowed farmers are often excluded from these markets due to high transaction costs. In this context, marketing traditional food crops poses an important income alternative. The present study aims to contribute to the scarce literature on traditional food crops by analyzing the factors influencing (a) the households' decision to participate in the finger millet market and (b) the selling prices obtained by the household. A special focus of our analysis lies on the role of gender and collective action. Based on household data from 270 finger millet producers, a probit model on market participation and a linear regression model on the selling price are estimated. Results show that participation in a finger millet group positively influences the decision to market finger millet. While female household members who do not participate in a group are disadvantaged in terms of selling prices, there is no gender effect on selling prices if a female household member participates in a finger millet group. Terms of use: Documents in Abstract

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Competition and Coordination in Liberalized African Cotton Market Systems

Cited by 124 publications

References 3 publications

Revisiting the “Cotton Problem”—A Comparative Analysis of Cotton Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa

Revisiting the “Cotton Problem”—A Comparative Analysis of Cotton Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa

Assessing the food security outcomes of industrial crop expansion in smallholder settings: insights from cotton production in Northern Ghana and sugarcane production in Central Ethiopia

Traditional Food Crop Marketing in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Gender Matter?

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