Competition and Cooperation in Natural Resources Exploitation: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Bischi, Gian Italo; Lamantia, Fabio; Sbragia, Lucia

doi:10.4337/9781845421441.00017

Cited by 25 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…agents that cooperate in maximizing the overall profit of a cooperative joint venture). Following Bischi et al (2004) we compute the Cournot-Nash equilibrium harvesting strategy under the assumption that cooperators and competitors (also denoted as defectors) coexist, the population being subdivided into a fraction of agents that form a cooperative venture and maximize the total profit of the set of cooperators, and the complementary fraction that engage a Cournot competition by maximizing their individual profits. This generalizes the harvesting functions given by Bischi et al (2005) because the two extreme cases of 100% cooperators or 100% defectors are obtained as limiting cases.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harvesting dynamics in protected and unprotected areas

Bischi¹,

Lamantia²

2007

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Harvesting dynamics in protected and unprotected areas

Bischi¹,

Lamantia²

2007

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…It has however been considered in a fisheries context (see, e.g.,Sethi andSomanathan 1996 andBischi et al 2004).…”

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confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements

Breton

Sbragia

Zaccour

2009

Environ Resource Econ

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104

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“…Following Bischi et al [59], we assume that cooperators always put in their fair share of the aggregate effort, ( ) ( )/ C e X E X N   . Solving (5) and dividing by N, we have:…”

Section: Cooperation and Collapse When Agents Are Myopic And Dependenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contagious Cooperation, Temptation, and Ecosystem Collapse

2013

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10Real world observations suggest that social norms of cooperation can be effective in overcoming social dilemmas such as the joint management of a common pool resource -but also that they can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse. We show that these patterns of erosion and collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural resource in which individual agents face the temptation to overexploit the resource, while a 15 cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations. We analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters (including the size of the community, and the rate of technological progress) trigger catastrophic transitions from relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation -causing the social-ecological system to collapse. 20

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Competition and Cooperation in Natural Resources Exploitation: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Cited by 25 publications

References 13 publications

Harvesting dynamics in protected and unprotected areas

Harvesting dynamics in protected and unprotected areas

A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements

Contagious Cooperation, Temptation, and Ecosystem Collapse

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