Competition among supply chains: Implications of full returns policy

Ai, Xingzheng; Chen, Jing; Zhao, Huapeng; Xiao-wo, Tang

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2012.04.018

Cited by 69 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 24 publications

(25 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…They focus on uncovering the effect of demand uncertainty on the implementation of buyback. Other buyback contract related studies include Choi et al (2008), Hsieh and Wu (2009), Gürler and Yılmaz (2010), Hou et al (2010), Ryu and Yücesan (2010), Chen (2011), Ai et al (2012), He and Zhao (2012), Shen and Willems (2012), Choi et al (2013), Shen et al (2013), Devangan et al (2013), Lee et al (2013), Wu (2013), Zhang et al (2014), Ohmura and Matsuo (2016). This paper is related to the above reviewed studies on buyback contracts as we also explore the use of buyback in achieving coordination.…”

Section: Buyback Contractsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Pareto Improving Supply Chain Coordination Under a Money-Back Guarantee Service Program

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Money-back guarantee (MBG) is a well-known service offered by many retailers. Under the MBG policy, a purchased item by a consumer can be returned for a full refund. In this paper, we explore a supply chain (SC) system comprising of one retailer, which offers the money-back guarantee policy and faces a stochastic demand. With a given supply contract offered by the supplier, the retailer makes decisions on the order quantity and the market coverage of the money-back guarantee service. With reference to real-world practices, we examine three models, namely, (1) the traditional wholesale pricing model without the buyback contract, (2) the model with a buyback contract (between the supplier and the retailer) for unsold items, and (3) a dual-buyback (DB) contract model for both unsold and consumer returned items. We find that using the buyback contract alone for unsold items cannot achieve Pareto improving supply chain coordination, whereas the DB contract can. Numerical findings also indicate that the DB contract can lead to an expansion of the money-back guarantee service program to cover more customers. This paper's findings support the implementation of the DB contract, which is commonly seen in the industry, for efficient supply chain management in the presence of the money-back guarantee service program.

show abstract

Section: Buyback Contractsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Pareto Improving Supply Chain Coordination Under a Money-Back Guarantee Service Program

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We illustrate it in Figure 3. When the product substitutability is under a certain value, i.e., 1 k , the platform is the dominant strategy.…”

Section: Imperfect Substitutementioning

confidence: 99%

Retail Channels Choice under Competition: Platform-Sell or Traditional Resell

Li¹,

Ma²

2018

IJUNESST

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…They consider the pricing problem for a two-echelon supply chain including two manufacturers and one retailer. Ai et al (2012) study the pricing problem in a supply chain of substitutable products by considering return policies and uncertain demand. They obtain the optimal decisions for the selling price, return policies, and clearance pricing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and quality level decisions of substitutable products in online and traditional selling channels: game‐theoretical approaches

Taleizadeh

Akhavizadegan

Ansarifar

2017

Int Trans Operational Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study addresses a pricing problem of two substitutable products in a two‐echelon supply chain including two manufacturers and one retailer. The manufacturers sell their products through two distribution channels, namely traditional and Internet channels. The linear demand functions of products depend on selling prices, service value of channels, and quality level of products. Moreover, various market power structures are considered for the members of the supply chain. This study focuses on the specific game‐theoretical approaches to highlight the effect of market power structures and leadership between firms. The manufacturer–leader Stackelberg (MSS) game, retailer–leader Stackelberg game (RSS), manufacturer‐Bertrand competition (MSB), and retailer‐Bertrand competitions (RSB) are applied to analyze equilibrium solutions. The models help both manufacturers and retailer not only to maximize their profits but also to see the influences of their powers and decisions under different strategies. As a result, the leader has enough power to get higher profit, and the maximum profit of the whole supply chain is affected by the market powers of manufacturers and retailer. The best strategies for the retailer are those that are based on the RS games. The results illustrate that lower price does not lead to lower profit, and more sales does not necessarily result in higher profit. Moreover, the Bertrand strategy considered by the manufacturers to determine their optimal decisions is the best strategy from the customers’ perspective.

show abstract

Competition among supply chains: Implications of full returns policy

Cited by 69 publications

References 24 publications

Pareto Improving Supply Chain Coordination Under a Money-Back Guarantee Service Program

Pareto Improving Supply Chain Coordination Under a Money-Back Guarantee Service Program

Retail Channels Choice under Competition: Platform-Sell or Traditional Resell

Pricing and quality level decisions of substitutable products in online and traditional selling channels: game‐theoretical approaches

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About