Competing Concepts of Subsidiarity in the Early Warning Mechanism

Fasone, Cristina

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2243503

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…14 The last revision has met with considerable enthusiasm: the academic commentary praises the Treaty for giving national parliaments an active role in EU policy-making processes, something which could serve to mitigate its democratic deficit. 15 This democratic progress ought to take place even if the legal mechanisms of subsidiarity ('yellow' and 'orange' card) were not triggered, since they should result from an increased engagement between various levels of governance. 16 This belief in the democratic relevance of 'dialogue' between the various levels of governance expounds, however, on a simplified understanding of the problem that subsidiarity should address.…”

Section: Subsidiarity and The Politicisation Of Eu Goals: The Davimentioning

confidence: 99%

The Way We Do Europe: Subsidiarity and the Substantive Democratic Deficit

Bartl

2015

European Law Journal

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The new institutional framework of subsidiarity is expected to lower the EU democratic deficit. In contrast to this optimistic scenario, I argue that the success of subsidiarity depends on its capacity to unravel the EU's ‘substantive’ democratic deficit. Linked to the Union's functionalist institutional design, this dimension of the democratic deficit has developed due to two limitations of EU‐level politics. First, the EU functionalist design has narrowed the range of topics open to democratic debate (horizontal substantive democratic deficit). Second, the proportion of the debate which we could genuinely describe as being political is declining as a result of the de‐politicisation of EU goals, underpinned by a massive accumulation of allegedly apolitical expert knowledge (vertical substantive democratic deficit). Against this background, I contend that by involving actors relatively alien to the EU functionalist thinking, subsidiarity could offer an opportune ground for the re‐politicisation of democratic ‘blind spots’ in EU policy making.

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Section: Subsidiarity and The Politicisation Of Eu Goals: The Davimentioning

confidence: 99%

The Way We Do Europe: Subsidiarity and the Substantive Democratic Deficit

Bartl

2015

European Law Journal

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“…Finally, the EWS, at least in theory, is only about subsidiarity – although in practice, parliaments often bring in considerations of proportionality, legal basis or substance as well (Fasone, 2013; Huysmans and van Gruisen, 2022; Jančić, 2015; Jaroszynski, 2020; Tacea, 2021; van den Brink, 2012). Whilst non‐subsidiarity arguments are often brought in, the Commission reserves the right to ignore those in the context of the EWS, as became clear in its response to parliamentary objections to the EPPO (Wieczorek, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subsidiarity Ex Ante and Ex Post: From the Early Warning System to the Court of Justice of the European Union

Huysmans,

van den Brink,

van Gruisen

2023

J of Common Market Studies

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The subsidiarity principle divides competences between the European Union and its Member States. The Lisbon Treaty suggests a connection between ex ante and ex post subsidiarity review. Ex ante, national parliaments were given a role via the early warning system (EWS). Ex post, legislation is subject to review by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). More than 10 years after Lisbon, this article is the first to theorize and evaluate whether there is indeed a connection. Our theory predicts a conditional connection. Quantitatively, we provide a two‐way classification of Member States based on their use of the EWS and CJEU subsidiarity cases. Qualitatively, we look back from court cases to the Council stage and analyse the Advocate General's opinions in subsidiarity cases. We find a weak conditional connection. A key explanation appears to be the Court's limited willingness to enforce subsidiarity and hence the limited incentives to go to court.

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“…For a fully-fledged reconstruction of the possible interpretations of subsidiarity, seeFasone (2013).25 For a different view on subsidiarity, see. For an updated overview of interparliamentary cooperationLupo, Fasone (2016).…”

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confidence: 99%

Parliaments, Public Opinion and Parliamentary Elections in Europe

2015

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The contributions collected in this Max Weber Working Papers Special Issue were first delivered at a conference held at the European University Institute and jointly organised by the Max Weber Programme for Postdoctoral Studies and the Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies in March 2015 on 'Parliaments and parliamentary elections in Europe'. Following the transformations undertaken by the European and national parliaments after the Treaty of Lisbon, the 2014 European elections, the unprecedented politicization and the challenges posed to representative democracy by the Eurozone crisis, the Special Issue aims to investigate three intertwined themes. (I) Parliamentary representation: European and national at the same time?; (II) national parliaments in EU policymaking; and (III) dynamics of Euroscepticism and its effects on law-making. In particular the papers deal with the ability of parliaments to democratically represent people in the European Union today and to affect the European integration process, with the asymmetric involvement of national parliaments in the EU, their dynamics of cooperation as well as between them and the European Parliament, and finally, with the implications on EU democratic legitimacy of recent developments regarding parliamentary input provided at a very early stage of the European policymaking. Other issues, such as transposition and the representation of eurosceptics in the European Parliament are also dealt with.

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Competing Concepts of Subsidiarity in the Early Warning Mechanism

Cited by 5 publications

References 57 publications

The Way We Do Europe: Subsidiarity and the Substantive Democratic Deficit

The Way We Do Europe: Subsidiarity and the Substantive Democratic Deficit

Subsidiarity Ex Ante and Ex Post: From the Early Warning System to the Court of Justice of the European Union

Parliaments, Public Opinion and Parliamentary Elections in Europe

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