Compassionate versus consequentialist conservation

Abstract

Ethical treatment of wildlife and consideration of animal welfare have become important themes in conservation, but ethical perspectives on how best to protect wild animals and promote their welfare are diverse. There are advantages to the consequentialist harms ethical framework applied in managing wild herbivores for conservation purposes. To minimize harms while achieving conservation goals, we argue that overabundant wild herbivores should in many cases be managed through consumptive in situ killing. Advantages of this policy are that the negative welfare states imposed on animals last only a short time; remaining animals are not deprived of positive welfare states (e.g., linked to rearing offspring); poor welfare states of animals in overabundant populations are avoided (e.g., starvation); negative welfare impacts on heterospecifics through resource depletion (i.e., competition) are prevented; harvesting meat reduces the number of (agricultural) animals raised to supply meat; and minimal costs maximize funding for other wildlife management and conservation priorities. Alternative ethical approaches to our consequentialist framework include deontology (containing animal rights) and virtue ethics, some of which underpin compassionate conservation. These alternative ethical approaches emphasize the importance of avoiding intentional killing of animals but, if no population reduction occurs, are likely to impose considerable unintentional harms on overabundant wildlife and indirectly harm heterospecifics through ineffective population reduction. If nonlethal control is used, it is likely that overabundant animals would be deprived of positive welfare states and economic costs would be prohibitive. We encourage conservation stakeholders to consider animal‐welfare consequentialism as an ethical approach to minimize harms to the animals under their care as well as other animals that policies may affect while at the same time pursuing conservation goals.

Underaddressed animal‐welfare issues in conservation

“…; Hampton et al. ) identifies sufficient benefits (biodiversity, economic) to offset the costs of animal welfare, then a decision to release biological agents may be ethically justified (Henzell et al. ).…”

“…We recognize the enormous benefits they have produced for conservation (Pedler et al 2016) and agriculture (Cooke et al 2013). If the consequentialist ethic that is most commonly applied to conservation (Nelson et al 2016;Hampton et al 2018b) identifies sufficient benefits (biodiversity, economic) to offset the costs of animal welfare, then a decision to release biological agents may be ethically justified (Henzell et al 2008). We contend though, that without explicit assessments of animal welfare, the information necessary for informed ethical debate is incomplete.…”

“…In comparison, professional culling techniques for species such as kangaroos (Macropus spp.) frequently achieve rates of nonfatal wounding approaching zero (Hampton et al 2018b). Animal-welfare outcomes for other historically used techniques such as muzzle-loading firearms and hound hunting have not been widely examined, which suggests the belief that their traditional nature should make them exempt from scrutiny (Gregory 2005).…”

“…; Hampton et al. ; Wallach et al. ), but few present animal‐based data and are therefore not instructive for scientific assessment or refinement of practices (Hampton et al.…”

“…Over the past 2 decades, the attention devoted to animal welfare in conservation and wildlife management has increased markedly (Kirkwood et al 1994;Dubois et al 2017). Many recent values-based ethical critiques have been published that oppose or support conservation practices and that purport to address animal welfare (e.g., Beausoleil et al 2018;Hampton et al 2018b;), but few present animal-based data and are therefore not instructive for scientific assessment or refinement of practices (Hampton et al 2016a). Other studies have presented empirical animal-welfare data but focused disproportionally on certain practices, notably culling (Bradshaw & Bateson 2000;Hampton & Forsyth 2016).…”