Comparison Of Institutional Arrangements For River Basin Management In Eight Basins

Blomquist, William; Dinar, Ariel; Kemper, Karin

doi:10.1596/1813-9450-3636

Cited by 58 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…The Australian government plays a major role in water policy development and financing. The institutional arrangements in the MDB have evolved through three major stages (Blomquist et al 2004):…”

Section: Policy and Institutional Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution and performance of river basin management in the Murray-Darling Basin

Ross¹,

Connell²

2016

E&S

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ABSTRACT. We explore bioregional management in the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) in Australia through the institutional design characteristics of the MDB River Basin Organization (RBO), the actors and organizations who supported and resisted the establishment of the RBO, and the effectiveness of the RBO. During the last 25 years, there has been a major structural reform in the MDB RBO, which has changed from an interstate coordinating body to an Australian government agency. Responsibility for basin management has been centralized under the leadership of the Australian government, and a comprehensive integrated Basin plan has been adopted. The driving forces for this centralization include national policy to restore river basins to sustainable levels of extraction, state government difficulties in reversing overallocation of water entitlements, the millennium drought and its effects, political expediency on the part of the Australian government and state governments, and a major injection of Australian government funding. The increasing hierarchy and centralization of the MDB RBO does not follow a general trend toward multilevel participative governance of RBOs, but decentralization should not be overstated because of the special circumstances at the time of the centralization and the continuing existence of some decentralized elements, such as catchment water plans, land use planning, and water quality. Further swings in the centralization-decentralization pendulum could occur. The MDB reform has succeeded in rebalancing Basin water allocations, including an allocation for the environment and reduced diversion limits. There are some longer term risks to the implementation of reform, including lack of cooperation by state governments, vertical coordination difficulties, and perceived reductions in the accountability and legitimacy of reform at the local level. If implementation of the Basin plan is diverted or delayed, a new institution, the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder, can play a major role in securing and coordinating environmental water supplies.

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Section: Policy and Institutional Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution and performance of river basin management in the Murray-Darling Basin

Ross¹,

Connell²

2016

E&S

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“…A number of scholars have successfully applied CPR theory to understand water allocation and infrastructure provision in larger river basins (Blomquist et al 2004(Blomquist et al , 2005Kerr 2007;Schlager and Blomquist 2008;Heikkila et al 2011;Schlager and Heikkila 2011;Heikkila and Schlager 2012;Yetim 2002). For example, CPR theory is applied to US interstate river compacts by Schlager and Blomquist (2008) and Heikkila and Schlager (2012) focus on cross-scale institutional linkages to assess the performance and climate change adaptability of US interstate river compacts, respectively; Yetim (2002) emphasizes the importance of clear property rights and enforcement mechanisms to solve International Common Pool Resources disputes; Blomquist et al (2005) and Kerr (2007) identified a number of factors of CPR theory related with successful river basin management, including, among others, leadership, the recognition of sub-basin authorities and nesting of organizational capacities and collective choice across scales.…”

Section: Cpr Theory Large Scale Contexts and Pollution Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, CPR theory is applied to US interstate river compacts by Schlager and Blomquist (2008) and Heikkila and Schlager (2012) focus on cross-scale institutional linkages to assess the performance and climate change adaptability of US interstate river compacts, respectively; Yetim (2002) emphasizes the importance of clear property rights and enforcement mechanisms to solve International Common Pool Resources disputes; Blomquist et al (2005) and Kerr (2007) identified a number of factors of CPR theory related with successful river basin management, including, among others, leadership, the recognition of sub-basin authorities and nesting of organizational capacities and collective choice across scales. As illustrated by those works, using CPR theory in large scale contexts entails a redefinition of concepts like user group and governance system, as well as the consideration of phenomena other than collective action problems (for example the existence of contentious politics).…”

Section: Cpr Theory Large Scale Contexts and Pollution Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Sandoz to Salmon: Conceptualizing resource and institutional dynamics in the Rhine watershed through the SES framework

Villamayor-Tomás

Fleischman²,

Ibarra³

et al. 2014

Int J Commons

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Abstract:In this paper we use a case study of the Rhine River to examine the relevance of Common Pool Resource (CPR) Theory for two conditions in which it has not been extensively tested: large scale international water management and pollution problems. For that purpose, we link variation in pollution abatement to a set of explanatory variables proposed by CPR theory. Causal inference is established through process tracing and a series of within-case comparison across actor groups (i.e. riparian nations, industry, and agriculture), resource types (i.e. point source, and 362 Sergio Villamayor-Tomas et al.non-point source pollutants), and time periods (1976)(1977)(1978)(1979)(1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986), when treaties provided a limited basis for collective action and pollution abatement, and 1987-2001, when the Rhine Action Plan proved more successful). According to our analysis, a number of CPR variables can help understanding cooperation for pollution abatement in the Rhine case. These include physical attributes such as clear hydrological boundaries; governance factors such as the articulation of monitoring and decision-making at different governance levels and the proportional allocation of costs and benefits of abating pollution; and actor factors like the small size, trust and homogeneity of some actor groups and leadership. Other variables proposed by CPR theory proved to be irrelevant or in need of qualification. These include the right to self-organize and to participate in decision-making, communication and resource-dependence. Finally, two variables, not emphasized by CPR theory, proved relevant: the occurrence of external disturbances and the role of interest groups. We conclude that CPR theory is valuable for explaining pollution management in large transboundary river basins, but requires qualification and extension.

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“…Bardhan (2000), examining the factors affecting irrigation maintenance in South India, finds that inequality has a negative effect. Likewise, Blomquist et al (2005) emphasize that extreme asymmetries in resource endowments among actors can imperil the success of decentralization efforts. In line with the discussion on the degree to which heterogeneity favours or hinders collective action, we must further distinguish carefully between elite domination and elite capture.…”

Section: Elite Capture In Natural Resource Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elite Capture in Local Fishery Management Post-Socialist Experiences from Albania

Schmidt¹,

Theesfeld

2012

SSRN Journal

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Local self-governance based on institutions for collective action can help overcome social dilemmas in the management of complex Common Pool Resources, such as fish. A common path towards local self-governance is decentralization, and within this context, a transfer of property rights from central government to local resource users. Yet, despite the well-documented successes of many decentralization policies in support of local common property regimes, the phenomenon of elite capture remains a risk. This paper investigates elite capture in Albania's Lake Ohrid fishing region. Our empirical findings draw onto an in-depth case study on local consequences of 2002's decentralization efforts by the Albanian fishery administration. We show how 'blueprint' approaches, top-down implementation, and weak institutions led to further empowerment of privileged locals. Our findings further indicate how those privileged locals realize significant personal gains at the expense of distributional inequity within the community. Specifically original insights are derived from our analysis of implications from the post-socialist context, which we show to facilitate capture because of a common susceptibility for destructive leadership and a lack of confidence in collective action. We believe that to understand those contextual peculiarities -and to act upon this understandingrepresents a pivotal prerequisite to the functional and equitable governance of common property regimes in any transitional society.

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Comparison Of Institutional Arrangements For River Basin Management In Eight Basins

Cited by 58 publications

References 11 publications

The evolution and performance of river basin management in the Murray-Darling Basin

The evolution and performance of river basin management in the Murray-Darling Basin

From Sandoz to Salmon: Conceptualizing resource and institutional dynamics in the Rhine watershed through the SES framework

Elite Capture in Local Fishery Management Post-Socialist Experiences from Albania

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