Comparing Regulatory Oversight Bodies Across the Atlantic: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the US and the Impact Assessment Board in the EU

Abstract

'Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?' asked the Roman poet Juvenal -'who will watch the watchers, who will guard the guardians?'1 As legislative and regulatory processes around the globe progressively put greater emphasis on impact assessment and accountability, (Verschuuren and van Gestel 2009, Hahn andTetlock 2007), we ask: who oversees the regulators? Although regulation can often be necessary and benefi cial, it can also impose its own costs. As a result, many governments have embraced, or are considering embracing, regulatory oversight -frequently relying on economic analysis as a tool of evaluation. We are especially interested in the emergence over the last four decades of a new set of institutional actors, the Regulatory Oversight Bodies (ROBs). These bodies tend to be located in the executive (or sometimes the legislative) branch of government. They review the fl ow of new regulations using impact assessment and benefi t-cost analysis, and they sometimes also appraise existing regulations to measure and reduce regulatory burdens. Through these procedures of regulatory review, ROBs have become an integral aspect not only of regulatory reform programs in many countries, but also of their respective administrative systems.Although most academic attention focuses on the analytical tools used to improve the quality of legislation, such as regulatory impact assessment (RIA) or benefi t-cost analysis, this chapter instead identifi es the key concepts and issues surrounding the establishment and operation of ROBs across governance systems. It does so by examining and comparing the oversight mechanisms that have been established in the United States and in the EU and by critically looking into their origins, rationales, mandates, institutional designs and scope of oversight.

The triumph of regulatory politics: Benefit–cost analysis and political salience

“…The IAB reviews both regulatory actions and legislation proposed by the Economic Commission. In the EU the Parliament and the Council cannot separately initiate legislation although they can amend proposals from the EC and do so without an amended BCA (Wiener & Alemanno 2010). 4 After publication of Graham's study, the CAIR rule was overturned in court, and the CAFÉ rules, after litigation, were superseded by legislative changes to the CAFÉ program.…”

“…The IAB reviews both regulatory actions and legislation proposed by the Economic Commission. In the EU the Parliament and the Council cannot separately initiate legislation although they can amend proposals from the EC and do so without an amended BCA (Wiener & Alemanno 2010).…”

Regulatory Quality in the European Commission and the UK: Old Questions and New Findings

“…First, the regular production of IAs -both the European Commission Directorates-General (DGs) and British departments -are heavy producers of assessments compared to the average EU member state. Second, there are oversight bodies (Wiener & Alemanno, 2010;Renda, 2010). The UK Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC), established in 2009, follows the experience of other European countries (like Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands) and the European Commission with oversight bodies.…”

Comparing the content of regulatory impact assessments in the UK and the EU

“…IA are regularly produced and special oversight bodies have been created to support government departments and European Commission Directorates-General, respectively, to check on the implementation of quality standards in the process of assessment (Wiener and Alemanno, 2010). In Brussels, the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) publishes opinions on the IAs produced by the different DGs.…”