Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan1

Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the most robust and deeply institutionalized alliance in the modern world, yet it has faced significant problems in running the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Specifically, the coalition effort has been plagued by caveats: restrictions on what coalition militaries can and cannot do. Caveats have diminished the alliance’s overall effectiveness and created resentment within the coalition. In this article, we explain why ISAF countries have employed a variety of caveats in Afghanistan, focusing on the period from 2003 to 2009. Caveats vary predictably according to the political institutions in each contributor to ISAF. Troops from coalition governments are likely to have caveats. Troops from presidential or majoritarian parliamentary governments tend, on average, to have fewer caveats, but specific caveats depend on the background of key decision makers in those countries. To demonstrate these points, we first review key limitations facing military contingents in Afghanistan. We then compare the experiences of Canada, France, and Germany and find that our institutional model does a better job of explaining the observed behavior than do competing explanations focusing on public opinion, threat, or strategic culture. We conclude with implications for both research and North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s future.

When Conflict Spreads: Arab Spring and the Limits of Diffusion

“…"He is determined that Syria will not make this a trend, and Russia will oppose collective action against Assad wherever it can." 12 The countries that did intervene on behalf of the rebels were reminded of the lessons from Kosovo and of Afghanistan: these efforts take longer than expected, cost a great deal of money, stretch the limits of their armed forces, cause significant friction with the alliance, and produce complicated results (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000;Saideman and Auerswald 2012). 13 Thus, while talk of some form of intervention to abet the rebels in Syria increased in early 2012, there is far less enthusiasm than France's President Sarkozy and Britain's Prime Minister Cameron displayed with regard to Libya in early 2011.…”

National restrictions in multinational military operations: A conceptual framework

“…Operational restrictions, also referred to as national caveats, are provisions that directly affect the mandate or rules of engagement of a country's contingent of forces in MMOs. A central concern of political and military decision-makers is that caveats can pose a hindrance to the effectiveness of MMOs and might ultimately undermine operational goals, especially for coalitions of many different countries where each national contingent brings along its own reservations and rules of engagement (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014;Frost-Nielsen, 2017;Ringsmose, 2010;Saideman & Auerswald, 2012). Coordination problems of this kind already haunted NATO operations in Kosovo where influential member states disagreed about military strategy, starting with the question whether to consider a ground intervention, to the selection of targets for strike missions, and the proper timing of a bombing pause-all of which threatened to undermine the military effort (Clark, 2001).…”

“…Although the prevalence of national restrictions in MMOs both raises intricate theoretical questions and contains obvious policy implications, it has so far received little attention in academic studies. Exceptions include an article by Saideman and Auerswald (2012), later turned into a book-length study on NATO's involvement in Afghanistan (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014), and a recent article by Frost-Nielsen (2017). Examining ISAF contributions and operational restrictions across a range of NATO member states, Saideman and Auerswald (2012) find substantial variance in caveats, which they explain on the basis of differences in political institutions, but also as a function of individual preferences, namely whether decision-makers focus their attention on outcomes or on behavior.…”

“…Recent scholarship in security studies has started to explore the causes and consequences of various forms of national restrictions on the use of force and participation in multinational military operations (MMOs). 2 Works in this vein have surveyed parliamentary accountability and parliamentary war powers (Born & Hänggi, 2005;Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2010;Wagner, Peters, & Glahn, 2010), constitutional and legal restrictions (Ku & Jacobson, 2003;Nolte, 2003), as well as national caveats in alliance and coalition operations (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014;Frost-Nielsen, 2017;Saideman & Auerswald, 2012). What is missing, however, is an integrated view of existing constraints and their impact upon security policy.…”

NATO Burden Sharing 1999-2010: An Altered Alliance

“… This becomes even clearer when one accounts for the caveats of restrictions that many allies––for example, Germany––place on the use of their forces in Afghanistan. See the fascinating article by Saideman and Auerswald () on caveats and ISAF. …”