Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets

Delacrétaz, David; Kominers, Scott Duke; Nichifor, Alexandru

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.010

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…By contrast, if f interferes, then some of the capacity it is using could be claimed by a higher-priority family. Interference-free matchings may be wasteful, which unfortunately is unavoidable due to a stark trade-off in matching markets with sizes between respecting priorities and eliminating waste-as Delacrétaz (2019) showed, if waste must be eliminated, then one cannot put any bound on the number of units that a family could claim at a more preferred locality. Moreover, the underuse of capacity may well be tolerable in the refugee resettlement context because it can be used for the next cohort of resettled refugee families.…”

Section: A Interference-free Matchingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement

Delacrétaz,

Kominers,

Teytelboym

2023

American Economic Review

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Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of refugee families and the capacities of communities. We propose four refugee resettlement mechanisms and two solution concepts that can be used in refugee resettlement matching under various institutional and informational constraints. Our theoretical results and simulations using refugee resettlement data suggest that preference-based matching mechanisms can improve match efficiency, respect priorities of communities, and incentivize refugees to report where they would prefer to settle. (JEL C78, D82, J15, J18)

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Section: A Interference-free Matchingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement

Delacrétaz,

Kominers,

Teytelboym

2023

American Economic Review

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“…2 See Vickrey (1961) for participation costs, Spenner and Freeman (2012) for attracting participants, Pathak and Sönmez (2008) for leveling the playing field, and Wilson (1987) and Bergemann and Morris (2005) for a designer's informational requirements. 3 Examples include auctions (Vickrey (1961), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Myerson (1981)), voting (Arrow (1963)), school choice (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003)), organ exchange (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004)), course allocation (Sönmez and Ünver (2010), Budish and Cantillon (2012)), and refugee resettlement (Jones and Teytelboym (2016), Delacrétaz, Kominers, and Teytelboym (2016)). 4 Direct mechanisms are not necessarily simple, and hence the revelation principle does not extend to simple extensive-form games; cf.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design

Pycia

Troyan

2023

ECTA

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We study extensive‐form games and mechanisms allowing agents that plan for only a subset of future decisions they may be called to make (the planning horizon). Agents may update their so‐called strategic plan as the game progresses and new decision points enter their planning horizon. We introduce a family of simplicity standards which require that the prescribed action leads to unambiguously better outcomes, no matter what happens outside the planning horizon. We employ these standards to explore the trade‐off between simplicity and other objectives, to characterize simple mechanisms in a wide range of economic environments, and to delineate the simplicity of common mechanisms such as posted prices and ascending auctions, with the former being simpler than the latter.

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“…A small number of papers discuss market design for other development challenges. Many of these expect government to be the main buyer, for example, incentives for vaccines (Kremer, 2001b,a), refugee allocation (Delacrétaz et al, 2020), and antiquity protection (Kremer and Wilkening, 2015). Closer to our motivation, Hussam et al (2022) explore how revelation mechanisms might be used to select quality borrowers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond boundaries

Silva Vargas

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Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets

Cited by 4 publications

References 26 publications

Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement

Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement

A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design

Beyond boundaries

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