“…Cf. Ferran (2001) (noting that limited evidence considered in the context of the UK's company law review supports the view that fiscal, operational and macro-economic considerations rather than company law are the major considerations in the decision whether or not to locate a business in a given country). 83 See Bratton and McCahery (2001: 701).…”
This is a time of spirited debate about regulatory competition in Europe.Discussions about competitive lawmaking abound. At the same time, the introduction of the European Company and the further harmonization attempts by the European Commission puts questions about the necessity of EU intervention into the company laws regulated by the member states. We, however, see no cause for excitement on either front. This article explains why not, drawing on analytical tools from law and economics. Analyzing the history of EU company law, we locate a stable noncompetitive equilibrium, which prevails in the EU. This equilibrium follows from member states that founded the EU unwilling to give up their lawmaking authority regarding company law issues. Since then, stability has ruled. The agenda-setting in EU company law changed little during the existence of the EU. Operative incentives, market structure, and regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as recent case law of the European Court of Justice triggered a loud discussion about competitive lawmaking in the EU.
“…Cf. Ferran (2001) (noting that limited evidence considered in the context of the UK's company law review supports the view that fiscal, operational and macro-economic considerations rather than company law are the major considerations in the decision whether or not to locate a business in a given country). 83 See Bratton and McCahery (2001: 701).…”
This is a time of spirited debate about regulatory competition in Europe.Discussions about competitive lawmaking abound. At the same time, the introduction of the European Company and the further harmonization attempts by the European Commission puts questions about the necessity of EU intervention into the company laws regulated by the member states. We, however, see no cause for excitement on either front. This article explains why not, drawing on analytical tools from law and economics. Analyzing the history of EU company law, we locate a stable noncompetitive equilibrium, which prevails in the EU. This equilibrium follows from member states that founded the EU unwilling to give up their lawmaking authority regarding company law issues. Since then, stability has ruled. The agenda-setting in EU company law changed little during the existence of the EU. Operative incentives, market structure, and regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as recent case law of the European Court of Justice triggered a loud discussion about competitive lawmaking in the EU.
As the Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union (2003) makes clear, the EU has sought to develop company and securities law as vital pillars of an overall attempt to improve Europe's international competitiveness. An important part of this is the creation of an integrated capital market in the EU. The regulation of takeover bids was deemed to be a key element of such an integrated market. This paper will focus on Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids and will seek to examine it under the regulatory microscope. It is too early to make a complete judgment about the Directive's effectiveness as a regulatory mechanism as this would involve determining whether it achieves its goals, secures high levels of compliance from Member States and market participants and is democratically accountable to the extent that its provisions affect the public interest. It is however possible to reflect upon some of its potential strengths and failings in respect of these criteria.
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