Community policing and the politics of local development in Tanzania

Abstract

This paper explores how the concept of 'community policing' has been understood and implemented in Tanzania. Whilst community policing is locally considered to be a very effective means of preventing crime and improving neighbourhood safety, the extent to which it constitutes a more accountable, responsive or 'democratic' form of policing, as assumed by proponents, is questionable. Based on research conducted in the city of Mwanza, this paper explains these outcomes in terms of continuities between forms of popular mobilisation that developed during Tanzania's socialist one-party era, and particularly the co-optation by the ruling party of sungusungu vigilantism, and understandings of the role of citizen participation in local development today. However, this paper suggests that as multiparty political competition becomes increasingly competitive, the sustainability of this model of community policing may be undermined, as citizens challenge the notion that they are obliged to provide resources for development directed from above.

Ulinzi Shirikishi: Popular Experiences of Hybrid Security Governance in Tanzania

“…This reflects understandings of participation that underpinned local development strategies during Tanzania's socialist era, whereby in pursuit of kujitegemea (self‐reliance) citizens were obliged to contribute labour and resources to build the nation (Marsland, ). Continuities in understandings of participation are apparent in the way in which leaders go about mobilizing communities to engage in ulinzi shirikishi today (Cross, ). In practice, however, popular willingness to bear the costs of local policing is undermined by collective action problems, which are exacerbated by observed and suspected inequality in the distribution of demands across communities.…”

“…car ownership) did not reflect the extent of inequality within the sub‐ward. For some, contributions were simply unaffordable in a time of high unemployment and food price volatility, and willingness to contribute was further diminished by a lack of clarity regarding how public funds were used, resulting from the lack of transparency and accountability that typically characterizes sub‐ward governance in Tanzania (see Cross, : 530–1). Difficulty in raising contributions for community policing programmes has also been reported in Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Zanzibar (OSFCVPI and OSIEA, : 59–60).…”

“…Firstly, bringing ‘development’, or in this case security, to one's constituency is a means for local leaders to further their own political ambitions both within and beyond the sub‐ward (Cross, ). Secondly, more immediate material gains are also available, incentivizing the evolution of community policing towards commercial security.…”

“…Historically they performed roles including registration of births, marriages and deaths, monitoring of visitors to their locality and mobilization of citizens to carry out communal works mandated by CCM. However, in today's multiparty context the ability of CCM representatives to influence their neighbours may be waning (Cross, ).…”

“…The legitimacy derived from links to sungusungu is vulnerable, however, in today's competitive multiparty system due to the continuing strong popular association of sungusungu with CCM (Cross, ).…”