Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players

Krishna, R. Vijay

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.003

Cited by 22 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Indeed, much effort has been devoted to achieve correlated-equilibrium payoffs by adding a pre-play communication stage to the main game: see in particular, Bárány (1992), Forges (1990), Ben-Porath (1998), Dodis, Halevi and Rabin (2000), Urbano and Vila (2002), Aumann and Hart (2003), Ben-Porath (2003), Gerardi (2004), Krishna (2006), Gerardi and Myerson (2007). These specific solutions, however, trade conceptual simplicity for computational efficiency and are exponentially far from being complexity-equivalent to achieving correlated equilibrium with a trusted mediator T .…”

Section: A Simpler But Non-trivial Special Application: Correlated Eqmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The implementations closer to achieving strategy equivalence are those of Ben-Porath (1998) and Krishna (2006). But they too miss strategy equivalence in its purest form.…”

Section: A Simpler But Non-trivial Special Application: Correlated Eqmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To illustrate the difficulty of doing so, consider the following simpler variant of pre-play implementations of BenPorath (1998) and Krishna (2006). The player have access to envelopes indistinguishable from each other, and to larger super-envelopes, also indistinguishable from each other.…”

Section: A Simpler But Non-trivial Special Application: Correlated Eqmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Perfect concrete implementation of arbitrary mechanisms

Micali

2010

Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions

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Section: A Simpler But Non-trivial Special Application: Correlated Eqmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The implementations closer to achieving strategy equivalence are those of Ben-Porath (1998) and Krishna (2006). But they too miss strategy equivalence in its purest form.…”

Section: A Simpler But Non-trivial Special Application: Correlated Eqmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Perfect concrete implementation of arbitrary mechanisms

Micali

2010

Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions

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“…For example, it is known that with two players, there are game forms in which mediated communication can achieve outcomes that are not attainable by cheap talk messaging (Forges 1990, Krishna 2007. But these counterexamples involve the play of correlated equilibrium in games with coordination opportunities.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another striking difference between our result and the theoretical literature on mediation in games of incomplete information is that we permit the mediator to be an additional player in the game, with arbitrary preferences. In the existing literature (Forges 1990, Ben-Porath 2003, Gerardi 2004, Krishna 2007, mediated communication involves a non-strategic communication device that receives and transmits messages, but does not have preferences over outcomes. Again, our broader result is possible because we focus on crisis bargaining games with voluntary agreements and mediation games with a ratification phase.…”

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confidence: 99%

When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation

Fey¹,

Ramsay²

2010

World Pol.

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We study the conflict mediation problem, sometimes called "shuttle diplomacy," when the mediator acts as a go-between and must gather information from the disputants. In the context of a general model of information mediation, we show that the incentive that disputants have to lie to the mediator undoes any advantage that might be gained by adding communication with a third party. In fact, our main result shows that any equilibrium outcome that is achievable through mediation is also achievable as an equilibrium outcome of a game with unmediated pre-play communication. This is true even when the mediator is allowed to have arbitrary preferences or biases. We then test our empirical prediction on dispute management efforts between 1937 and 1985. The analysis supports the hypothesis that information mediation has no effect in environments where the mediator has no independent source of information.

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Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games

Forges

2009

Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

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GlossaryBayesian game: an interactive decision problem consisting of a set of n players, a set of types for every player, a probability distribution which accounts for the players' beliefs over each others' types, a set of actions for every player and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function de…ned over n-tuples of types and actions for every player.Nash equilibrium: in an n-person strategic form game, a strategy n-tuple from which unilateral deviations are not pro…table.von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function: a utility function which re ‡ects the individual's preferences over lotteries. Such a utility function is de…ned over outcomes and can be extended to any lottery by taking expectation with respect to . 1 Pure strategy (or simply strategy): a mapping which, in an interactive decision problem, associates an action with the information of a player whenever this player can make a choice.Sequential equilibrium: a re…nement of the Nash equilibrium for n-person multistage interactive decision problems, which can be loosely de…ned as a strategy n-tuple together with beliefs over past information for every player, such that every player maximizes his expected utility given his beliefs and the others' strategies, with the additional condition that the beliefs satisfy (possibly sophisticated) Bayes updating given the strategies.Strategic (or normal) form game: an interactive decision problem consisting of a set of n players, a set of strategies for every player and a (typically, von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function de…ned over n-tuples of strategies for every player.Utility function: a real valued mapping over a set of outcomes which re‡ects the preferences of an individual by associating a utility level ( a "payo¤") with every outcome.

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Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players

Cited by 22 publications

References 10 publications

Perfect concrete implementation of arbitrary mechanisms

Perfect concrete implementation of arbitrary mechanisms

When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation

Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games

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