Communication between young rhesus monkeys

Mason, William A.; Hollis, John H.

doi:10.1016/0003-3472(62)90040-4

Cited by 55 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Experimental evidence supports this pattern: Direct tests for spontaneous prosociality were positive for cooperatively breeding primates (tamarins 42,43 but see 73 and marmosets 45 ) but not for independently breeding primates (chimpanzees [55][56][57]74 and macaques [58][59][60]61 ), with capuchin monkeys being intermediate in both allomaternal care [62][63][64][65][66] and prosociality. 67,68 Nevertheless, some species with exclusive maternal care, such as bonobos and chimpanzees, cooperate to some degree, both in the wild and in captivity.…”

Section: Box 1: Spontaneous Prosociality In Nonhuman Primatesmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…[58][59][60][61] Capuchin monkeys show more elements of cooperative breeding than do the Pan species, with occasional allomaternal carrying, suckling of older infants between the ages of 3 and 6 months, and low levels of allomaternal provisioning. [62][63][64][65][66] The majority of shared food is transferred from allomothers to immatures.…”

Section: Box 1: Spontaneous Prosociality In Nonhuman Primatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cooperative breeding and human cognitive evolution

Burkart

Hrdy

Schaik³

2009

Evolutionary Anthropology

483

406

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Despite sharing a recent common ancestor, humans are surprisingly different from other great apes. The most obvious discontinuities are related to our cognitive abilities, including language, but we also have a markedly different, cooperative breeding system. Among many nonhuman primates and mammals in general, cooperative breeding is accompanied by psychological changes leading to greater prosociality, which directly enhances performance in social cognition. Here we propose that these cognitive consequences of cooperative breeding could have become more pervasive in the human lineage because the psychological changes were added to an ape-level cognitive system capable of understanding simple mental states, albeit mainly in competitive contexts. Once more prosocial motivations were added, these cognitive abilities could also be used for cooperative purposes, including a willingness to share mental states, thereby enabling the emergence of shared intentionality. Shared intentionality has been identified as the original source of many uniquely human cognitive abilities, including cumulative culture and language. Shared intentionality rests on a fundamentally prosocial disposition that is strikingly absent in chimpanzees, but present in cooperatively breeding primates. Thus, our hypothesis is that while chimpanzees and perhaps all great apes exhibit many of the important cognitive preconditions for uniquely human mental capacities to evolve, they lack the psychological preconditions. In humans, we argue, the two components merged, the cognitive component due to common descent from ape ancestors and the motivational component due to convergent evolution of traits typical of many cooperative breeders.As recently as 6 to 7 million years ago, the hominin lineage split off from the rest of the great ape (hominid) lineage 1 and consequently shares many biological traits and behavioral and cognitive similarities with great apes. 2,3Nevertheless, humans also exhibit remarkable differences from our closest relatives. First, we not only live far longer lives and reproduce at faster rates than do the other great apes, but our offspring take much longer to mature and women cease reproduction well before somatic senescence sets in.4 Second, our ecological niche involves specialization on large, valuable food packages that have to be acquired together, as well as shared, and mandatory reliance on techniques acquired through cumulative culture.5 This niche and our social relationships are based on an un-apelike selflessness, a degree of hypersociality reflected in a concern for others, eagerness to share food and information with others, and cooperation in a wide array of contexts, even with nonrelatives and near-strangers.5-8 Our mode of life facilitates our spread into new habitats, resulting in a ubiquitous geographic distribution.9 Third, with regard to intellectual performance, humans differ from the other great apes, which, as a group, show relatively homogeneous cognitive abilities. [10][11][12]

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Section: Box 1: Spontaneous Prosociality In Nonhuman Primatesmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Box 1: Spontaneous Prosociality In Nonhuman Primatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative breeding and human cognitive evolution

Burkart

Hrdy

Schaik³

2009

Evolutionary Anthropology

483

406

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“…In chimpanzees, four studies did not find any evidence for proactive prosociality, even in mother -offspring dyads (Silk et al 2005;Jensen et al 2006;Vonk et al 2008;Yamamoto & Tanaka 2010). In macaques, there was also hardly any evidence for prosociality in provisioning games (Mason & Hollis 1962;Colman et al 1969;Schaub 1996). (A recent study did report provisioning from dominants to subordinates; Massen et al 2010).…”

Section: Evidence For Psychological Rulesmentioning

confidence: 97%

On the psychology of cooperation in humans and other primates: combining the natural history and experimental evidence of prosociality

Jaeggi

Burkart

Schaik

2010

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

180

177

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In any given species, cooperation involves prosocial acts that usually return a fitness benefit to the actor. These acts are produced by a set of psychological rules, which will be similar in related species if they have a similar natural history of cooperation. Prosocial acts can be (i) reactive, i.e. in response to specific stimuli, or (ii) proactive, i.e. occur in the absence of such stimuli. We propose that reactive prosocial acts reflect sensitivity to (i) signals or signs of need and (ii) the presence and size of an audience, as modified by (iii) social distance to the partner or partners. We examine the evidence for these elements in humans and other animals, especially non-human primates, based on the natural history of cooperation, quantified in the context of food sharing, and various experimental paradigms. The comparison suggests that humans share with their closest living relatives reactive responses to signals of need, but differ in sensitivity to signs of need and cues of being watched, as well as in the presence of proactive prosociality. We discuss ultimate explanations for these derived features, in particular the adoption of cooperative breeding as well as concern for reputation and costly signalling during human evolution.

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“…Of particular interest in this paper is the comparison between the verbal behavior of two chimpanzees, Sherman and Austin, and the behavior of two pigeons, Jack and Jill (Epstein et al, 1980). Prior to the publication of the finding of intraspecies symbolic communication between Sherman and Austin (Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, & Boyson, 1978a), previous instances of symbolic communication between animals (Bastian, 1967;Mason & Hollis, 1962) had inevitably been compromised by the fact that although the animals' behavior could be said to transmit information, the animals themselves did not evidence any knowledge of this fact. That is, it could not be shown that these animals were, in any sense, "aware" (Crook, 1983) of their communicating, and hence it was concluded that they transmitted signals that served the purposes of communication quite unintentionally (Bastian, 1967;Mason & Hollis, 1962).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Verbal Behavior at a Procedural Level in the Chimpanzee

Savage‐Rumbaugh¹

1984

J Exper Analysis Behavior

174

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Ape language research has typically employed cognitive descriptions of ape competencies. Recently, Epstein, Lanza, and Skinner (1980) attempted to simulate some of the ape findings with pigeons. They also used cognitive terms to describe their results, but with "tongue-in-cheek." In the hope of bringing about a better understanding of the ape research, this paper describes the main aspects of one ape language project, using a behavior-analytic framework. It then briefly compares and contrasts, from that perspective, the training programs used with pigeons and with apes. It is concluded that the behavior-analytic framework, and the procedures devised to produce language skills in apes, provide strong support for several of the major positions set forth in Skinner's (1957) Verbal Behavior.

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Communication between young rhesus monkeys

Cited by 55 publications

References 15 publications

Cooperative breeding and human cognitive evolution

Cooperative breeding and human cognitive evolution

On the psychology of cooperation in humans and other primates: combining the natural history and experimental evidence of prosociality

Verbal Behavior at a Procedural Level in the Chimpanzee

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