Communication and cooperation

Avoiding the sharp tongue: Anticipated written messages promote fair economic exchange

“…) One reason is that laboratory studies on this issue have generally used repeated games so that disapproval effects are due to unknown combinations of factors including communication, reactions to disapproval, and attempts to avoid disapproval (Masclet et al, 2003). Indeed, communication and reaction require repeat interaction to encourage norm obedience effectively, as has been well-demonstrated in laboratory research (see, e.g., Miller et al, 2002;Masclet et al, 2003 ;Noussair and Masclet, 2005.) However, these results do not inform the role of disapproval avoidance in social norm enforcement 1 .…”

The prisoner’s dilemma on co-evolving networks under perfect rationality

“…The model is based on the prisoner's dilemma (PD) [5] -one of the most impressive ways of illustrating situations of human interactions where mutual trust is beneficial, but egotism leads to a breach of promise. The fundamental interest in the PD arises from its applicability in a variety of fields, ranging from physics and biology to economics and finance [6,7,8]. It is of particular interest in constitutional economics [9,10,11].…”

Coevolutionary games on networks

“…The different regimes of relaxation dynamics can be explained by a closer look on the structure of the Nash equilibria involved (Sec. IV) as well as on the relaxation M P(M) 10 mechanism which is given by a confined branching process (Sec. V).…”

“…The central question is how social order is possible and how cooperative behavior can emerge. Examples for such spatially extended dilemmas are biological networks, where connected plants may or may not decide to share resources [8], the analysis of internet congestion [9], models for economic communication [10], and, of course, many sociological problems from conflict research to public transportation [11,12].…”