Common Ownership and Startup Growth

Eldar, Ofer; Grennan, Jillian; Waldock, Katherine

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3406205

Cited by 18 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 72 publications

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“…Their evidence confirms the theoretical predictions in López and Vives (2019). Eldar, Grennan and Waldock (2019) document the bright side of common ownership as well and show that startups benefit from investors that hold stakes in competitors. Our paper contributes to this emerging literature by showing that common ownership also alters firms' incentives to invest in CSR, an important corporate strategic decision.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 77%

Common Ownership and Corporate Social Responsibility

Dai

Qiu

2020

SSRN Journal

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This paper studies the effect of common ownership on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that common ownership is positively associated with a firm's social performance. Additional tests strength the causal interpretation of the results. The empirical evidence is consistent with the predictions from a model in which CSR serves as a strategic tool for a firm to strengthen its product market position.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 77%

Common Ownership and Corporate Social Responsibility

Dai

Qiu

2020

SSRN Journal

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“…As a result, the empirical findings may be spurious. Others find that common ownership produces outcomes that are positive for competition and good corporate strategy: increased diffusion of innovations (Kostovetsky and Manconi, 2020), profitability and prices that are more consistent with firms that are competitive rather than cooperative (Kini et al, 2019; Koch, Panayides, and Thomas, 2020), and in the case of VC‐funded start‐ups with common owners, greater capital‐raising, lower likelihood of failures, and more successful exits via IPOs or acquisitions (Eldar et al, 2020).…”

Section: Response To Goranova and Ryan’s (2021) Critiquementioning

confidence: 99%

The Endurance of Shareholder Value Maximization as the Preferred Corporate Objective

Inkpen

Sundaram

2021

J Management Studies

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Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a, 2004b) proposed shareholder value maximization (SVM) as the preferred corporate objective since it alone impels the firm to implement strategies that enhance outcomes for all stakeholders. Goranova and Ryan (2021) argue that three recent developments – common ownership, decoupling of owners from managers, and greater divergence in shareholder interests – call into question our SVM view. We dispute their arguments: (i) The developments they cite are overplayed in the literature, and may not matter much for SVM; (ii) To the extent they do matter, their concern is less about SVM’s relevance as corporate objective but more whether these developments bias decisions towards the short‐term. We do not disagree since, after all, Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) is solely about SVM for the long‐term; (iii) If anything, Goranova and Ryan’s (2021) proposed solution of ‘strategic corporate governance’ can be viewed as an endorsement of the relevance and enduring primacy of SVM for the long‐term.

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“…The empirical research on common ownership is active and ongoing. Some papers find small or no effects of common ownership and some find positive effects on the growth of startups (Lewellen and Lowry (2020), Eldar, Grennan, and Waldock (2020)). More empirical work will be needed before we have a clear sense of the empirical implications.…”

Section: A Simple Model Of Imperfect Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

A Comment on: “ General Equilibrium Oligopoly and Ownership Structure” by José Azar and Xavier Vives

Philippon

2021

ECTA

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Common Ownership and Startup Growth

Cited by 18 publications

References 72 publications

Common Ownership and Corporate Social Responsibility

Common Ownership and Corporate Social Responsibility

The Endurance of Shareholder Value Maximization as the Preferred Corporate Objective

A Comment on: “ General Equilibrium Oligopoly and Ownership Structure” by José Azar and Xavier Vives

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